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I. INTRODUCTION: HIV DISEASE AND SUICIDE 
A 1988 study from Cornell University Medical College and 
the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of New York City 
found that in 1985 suicide among men between the ages of 
twenty and fifty nine with HIV disease l was 36 times more likely 
1. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) disease refers to the full spectrum of 
health experienced by people infected with the HIV virus. The three stages of HIV dis-
ease are early/asymptomatic, middle/ARC (AIDS Related Condition), and late/AIDS 
(Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). Many of these HIV-infected men and women 
are without any symptoms and many are even unaware of their being HIV-infected; 
these patients are labeled asymptomatic seropositives. Other patients have mild signs of 
immune impairment and/or nonspecific signs of chronic disease (e.g. mild weight loss 
and fatigue); these people have ARC (AIDS Related Condition). Over time, generally 5 
to 15 years after infection with the HIV virus, HIV disease often progresses to full-blown 
AIDS. In this stage, HIV -infected people experience life-threatening infections called op-
portunistic infections (e.g., pneumocystis carinii pneumonia), malignancies (e,g., Kaposi's 
Sarcoma), severe weight loss, and/or dementia. People with AIDS may succumb to their 
initial severe infection or may recover and function well for an additional 1-2 years. 
Note, however, that people with a Kaposi's Sarcoma diagnoses tend to have a better 
prognosis than people with other AIDS-qualifying diagnosis. There are many social and 
psychological sequelae of HIV disease, These include stigmatization of HIV -infected peo-
ple and their families and even their health providers. These stigmatizations are based 
on HIV -infected people belonging to certain socially marginalized groups such as gay 
men, intravenous drug users, and people with multiple sexual partners. Stigmatization is 
also based on fear of contagiousness and the concomitant realization that HIV disease is 
a progressive, devastating illness, affecting people in the prime of life, and a disease 
which is incurable and often terminal. Many people with HIV disease, including those 
who are physically well, suffer from anxiety and depression. These psychological 
2
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than among noninfected men in New York City's general popu-
lation.2 One half of these suicides occurred in Hispanic or black 
patients, of which one-half expressed their intent to commit sui-
cide. Dr. Peter Marzuk, who conducted the research, believes 
that even his estimate (that one thousand HIV-infected patients 
will probably commit suicide by 1991) is probably an underesti-
mate because suicide is frequently unreported. 3 Significant rates 
of AIDS-related suicide are not limited to New York: the San 
Francisco Suicide Prevention Center receives sixty to one hun-
dred AIDS-related calls per month.' In fact, a 1986 California 
study of death certificates of men between the ages of 20 and 39 
found that the relative suicide rate of men with HIV disease was 
21 times the rate of men without HIV disease. II Suicide is more 
prevalent among persons with HIV disease because of the 
"profound and progressive nature of the illness, the seeming un-
changeability of the condition, and the often painful and disfig-
uring deterioration that occurs."e "Friends and relatives who as-
sist such people, however, face criminal [and civil] liability 
under existing law. Thus, it is not surprising that there is a 
growing number of cases of 'secret' or 'concealed' suicide assis-
tance. There is no indication that current case law has con-
problems may stem from pragmatic concerns about finances, access to health care, and 
ability to maintain a job, to more abstract concerns about self-disclosure to friends and 
family, fear of chronic illness, and concerns about mortality. 
Interview with Lisa C. Capaldini, M.D., M.P.H., Assistant Clinical Professor of Medicine, 
University of California, San Francisco (Jan. 23, 1991). 
2. Marzuk, Tierney, Tardiff et al., Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons with AIDS, 
259 J. A.MA 1333 (1988) [hereinafter Marzuk). 
3. Mydens, AIDS Patients' Silent Companion Is Often Suicide, Experts Discover, 
N. Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990, sec. A, p. 1. 
4. P. GOLDBLUM AND J. MOULTON, "HIV DISEASE AND SUICIDE," in FACE TO FACE A 
GUIDE TO AIDS COUNSELING, (J. Dilley, C. Pies and M. Helquist, eds., San Francisco: 
AIDS Health Project, University of California., 1989, p. 153) [hereinafter Goldblum). 
5. Kizer, Green, Perkins, Doebbert, Hughes, AIDS and Suicide in California, 260 J. 
A.M.A. 1881 (1988). 
6. Goldblum, supra note 4 at 152. "In recent years ... [the Hemlock Society] has 
been joined by scores of young men afflicted with AIDS .... " Id., at 152. The Hem-
lock Society is an organization which was formed in order to promote the concept of 
active euthanasia. The organization was founded in 1980 by Derek Humphrey. Today, 
the Hemlock Society has 35,000 dues-paying members, has published nine books, and in 
1989 had a budget of $700,000. Rarick, AIDS Adding to Ranks of Hemlock Society, 
Death with Dignity Lobby; Euthanasia; A Journalist-Turned Activist Leads the Move-
ment to Legalize Suicide Assistance for the Dying, L.A. Times, Aug. 26,1990, at A28, 
col. 1. More recently the Hemlock Society/Carol Publishing has published a best sell-
ing suicide manual "Final Exit". Steinfels, At Crossroads, U.S. Ponders Ethics of 
Helping Others Die, N. Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1991, at AI, col. 2. 
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fronted this social problem [of suicide assistance]."7 
However, the increasing frequency of public debate regard-
ing the concept of a rational suicide,s combined with the legal 
system's treatment of certain private acts of suicide and assisted 
suicide, demonstrates the evolving cultural legitimacy of rational 
suicide. Nevertheless, current laws are still predicated on the be-
lief that there is no such thing as rational (legitimate or func-
tional) suicide. This article first traces the evolution of attitudes 
and subsequent laws regarding suicide and assisted suicide. Sec-
ondly, the criminal and civil liability of assisted suicide is as-
sessed on the basis of California case law. 
Lastly, this paper will discuss the applicability of the de-
fenses of the right of privacy and the right of 'autonomy to acts 
of suicide and assisted suicide. This discussion will focus on the 
7. Sheffer, Criminal Liability For Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348 (1986) 
[hereinafter Sheffer). 
8. Suicide is defined "as doing something which results in one's death ... " 
Brandt, The Rationality of Suicide, in Suicide: The Philosophical Issues, 117, 118 (M. 
Battin & D. Mayo eds. 1980). The definition of rational suicide is still being debated; 
however, most definitions require that the person contemplating suicide have some form 
of terminal illness. The 1988 California Humane and Dignified Death Initiative, which 
did not acquire the necessary 450,000 verified signatures necessary to get on the ballot, 
required terminal illness certification and competence. Parachini, The California Hu-
mane and Dignified Death Initiative, in Mercy, Murder, and Morality.' Perspectives on 
Euthanasia HASTINGS CENTER REP. 1, 11, (Special Supplement, Jan./Feb. 1989). In No-
vember of 1991, voters of Washington state voted on Initiative 119 which allows physi-
cians to legally perform active euthanasia without criminal sanctions on "a conscious and 
mentally competent, qualified patient ..... Candidates for active euthanasia [rational 
suicide assistance in this case by physicians) would be patients who are terminally ill or 
have an irreversible condition that, in the opinion of two physicians, would result in 
death within six months. The patient must be conscious and mentally competent, and 
voluntarily request the service in writing at the time it is to be rendered." Genal, A Right 
to Die, 9, 14, AM. MED. NEWS Jan. 7, 1991. Note that Initiative 119 was defeated by 54% 
of the voters. Paulson. No to aid in dying-but fight goes on. Seattle Post Intelligence. 
Nov. 7. 1991, at A9. col. 1. Proponents of 119 argue that last minute television ads dis-
torted the truth by stating that the initiative had no safeguards. "The state Attorney 
General's Office considered the argument and determined that the initiative was written 
with safeguards and that the opposition could not reasonably contend none existed." 
Paulson, Aid in dying initiative is rejected, Seattle Post Intelligence, Nov. 6, 1991. at 
AI, col. 1. Other ethical factors considered include. "When terminal illness and the pain 
associated with it are experienced as essentially meaningless, when the future is per-
ceived as holding nothing but further affliction and debilitation and there no longer ap-
pear to be grounds for confidence and courage with respect to what is yet to be. and 
when it seems that significant others no longer care nor want to be cared for, then the 
wish to choose death above life is eminently reasonable and understandable." E. Young. 
Assisting Suicide: An Ethical Perspective, 3 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 281, 287 (1987). 
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right of a person with HIV disease to enlist the assistance of the 
medical profession to make his or her death as quick and as 
painless as possible, a practice which under the current law 
could be classified as murder. The paper will conclude with an 
assertion that the charges of murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
and aiding and abetting a rational suicide should not apply to 
true "mercy killing." Concomitantly, civil suits and other laws 
affecting the administration and disposition of the estate or in-
surance proceeds should likewise not apply to true "mercy 
killing." 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF RATIONAL 
SUICIDE 
Some modern ethicists argue that the recent changes in atti-
tudes regarding euthanasia are the result of the secularization of 
modern culture.9 However, arguments continue to be made 
against euthanasia relying on the Judeo-Christian axiom that 
human life is sacred and only God may take life away. The 
changes in California law provide a unique opportunity to look 
at why and how a society departs from the Judeo-Christian ax-
iom that only God may take life away. Whether or not California 
will ultimately choose to legalize assisted suicide for terminally 
ill patients such as those who suffer from HIV disease remains 
to be seen. However, a historical review of California's laws may 
shed light on what that outcome may very well be as well as 
explain why courts are inconsistent in treating cases involving 
suicide and assisted suicide. 
Section A briefly traces the origins of suicide and assisted 
suicide laws which have profoundly impacted the treatment of 
suicide in modern culture. Section B more specifically reviews 
the development and the reasoning underlying California's laws 
which relate to suicide. Section C deals with the California 
Court's treatment of the right to privacy and autonomy regard-
ing health care treatment and its relationship to suicide and as-
sisted suicide. Lastly, Section D reveals the attitudes of secular 
institutions, the public in general, and ethicists regarding with-
holding or withdrawing medical treatment (passive euthanasia), 
9. Doerflinger, Assisted Suicide: Pro-Choice or Anti-Life?, in Mercy, Murder, & Mo-
rality: Perspectives on Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP. I, 16 (Special Supplement, 
16, Jan./Feb., 1989). 
5
McCoy: HIV Disease and Assisted Suicide
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
442 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:437 
as well as emerging attitudes regarding active euthanasia 
("mercy killings"). 
A. EARLY ATTITUDES TOWARD SUICIDE: 348 B.C. TO 1700 A.D. 
Some ancient primitive societies believed that the act of sui-
cide released evil spirits and regarded suicide with horror. lO The 
attitude of contemporary primitive cultures is also divided. 
Some cultures regard suicide with condemnation while others ei-
ther "tolerated or encourage 'altruistic suicide.' "11 
The early Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle regarded 
suicide "as an offense against the gods or the state."12 However, 
the Roman stoics "tended to condone suicide as a lawful and 
rational exercise of individual freedom and even as an act of 
wisdom in the cases of old age, disease, or dishonor."l3 The Ro-
man Empire's acceptance of suicide deteriorated with the de-
cline of the Empire. In fact, "the nobleman's fear of losing his 
serf to an early death may have played a major role in establish-
ing antisuicidal legislation during this period."14 The Roman 
Catholic Church, through the works of Augustine of Hippo, who 
pronounced that suicide was the worst of sins, set the stage for 
ecclesiastical attitudes for the next thousand years. "Barbarous" 
laws were established by the Church and the state punishing 
suicide. Iii 
10. Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone, Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right ?, 24 DUQ. L. 
REV. 17 (1985) (citing R. FEDDEN, SUICIDE; A SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL STUDY 27-48 (1938)) 
(hereinafter Marzen]. 
11. Id. at 17, (citing B. MALINOWSKI, Crime and Custom in Savage Society 78, 94-98 
(4th ed. 1947). "Most seem to have regarded it with horror that was often associated 
with fear of the evil spirits it was believed to set loose." Id., at 17, (citing B. MALINOWSKI, 
Crime and Custom in Savage Society 78, 94-98 (4th ed. 1947)). However, some societies 
did not regard suicide with horror. "In ancient China and India, for example, the 'suttee,' 
in which a widow leapt onto the burning funeral pyre of her deceased husband, was 
widely practiced." Id., at 17, (citing N. FARBEROW, CULTURAL HISTORY OF SUICIDE, in SUI-
CIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES 1, 3-4 (N. Farberow ed. 1975)). 
12. Velasquez, Defining Suicide, 3 ISSUES IN L. AND MED. 37, 40 (1987). 
13. Id. at 40. 
14. Id. at 40-41, (citing H. FEDDEN, SUICIDE; A SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL STUDY, at 85-
95 (1980). 
15. Velasquez, supra note 12 at 41. Examples of canonical directives illustrate the 
Roman Catholic Church's position on suicide. For example, "[t]he Council of Aries (452 
A.D.), ... incorporated the Roman law's forfeiture of a suicide's estate. The Council of 
Braga (563 A.D.) banned religious rites for suicides. The Antisidor Council (590 A.D.) 
provided penalities for suicide, and the Synod of Nimes (1284 A.D.) denied suicides 
Christian burial." Marzen, supra note 11 at 29 (citing FARBEROW, CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
6
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During the Renaissance, the Roman stoics' acceptance of 
suicide and encouragement of autonomy regarding decisions of 
life and death were reiterated.16 However, in the following era, 
the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther and John Calvin 
stated respectively that suicide was the "work of the devil" or 
"ingratitude towards God."17 In the early 1600s, Anglican clergy-
men Robert Burton and John Donne began to question the com-
plete condemnation of suicide. IS Basically, they questioned the 
validity of eternally condemning those who commit suicide and 
suggested that in individual cases suicide can be justified and 
acceptable to God.19 By the early 1700s, however, the Christian 
church in England opposed suicide as a sin against God which 
would result in souls damned forever. 2o 
Nevertheless, the Reformation and the Renaissance en-
couraged personal inquiry and sparked the secularization of 
philosophical thought. 
With the increasing secularization of philosophi-
cal thought in the eighteenth century, arguments 
opposing the absolute condemnation of suicide 
multiplied and mitigated the view of suicide as in-
herently sinful or criminal. Likewise, popular atti-
tudes revealed an increasing toleration of suicide; 
the divergence between the laws against suicide 
and the enforcement of those laws grew wider, 
and in some places, penalties against suicide alto-
gether disappeared.21 
In fact, by the end of the nineteenth century, most anti-suicide 
laws, including California's, were no longer in existence.22 
B. MODERN ATTITUDES: THE CALIFORNIA LEGAL SYSTEM 
Ultimately, the criminalization of suicide was undermined 
not by evolving religious ideas but by the scientific finding that 
SUICIDE, in SUICIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES at 7 (N. Farberow ed. 1975)). 
16. Marzen, supra note 10 at 25. See a/so, F. THONNARD, A SHORT HISTORY OF PHI-
LOSOPHY (1955). 
17. Marzen, supra note 10 at 31. 
18. [d. at 31-32. 
19. [d. 31-32. 
20. [d. at 32-33. 
21. Velasquez, supra note 12 at 41. 
22. [d. at 42. 
7
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suicide is caused by psychiatric disorders and should be consid-
ered a reflection of disease, not a crime.2s The California Su-
preme Court noted the felony status of suicide at common law 
but said, "Under American law, suicide has never been punished 
and the ancient English attitude has been expressly re-
jected . . . . Rather than classifying suicide as criminal, suicide 
in the United States has continued to be considered an expres-
sion of mental illness."u 
In 1984, the Lanterman-Petus-Short Act was enacted.2~ The 
Act provides for the involuntary commitment of "any person, as 
a result of a mental disorder, [who] is in danger ... to himself 
or herself . . . "28 Once a suicidal person has been admitted to a 
hospital for care, the hospital and treating psychiatrist are sub-
ject to civil liability regarding the safekeeping of that suicidal 
patient.27 The hospital/psychiatrist liability appears to be im-
posed because a "constructive assisted suicide" has arisen under 
the guise of a negligence action. 
While suicide itself is no longer a criminal offense, assisted 
suicide is treated as a felony offense. In 1873, the California leg-
islature adopted a law against assisted suicide which has re-
mained unchanged to the present: "Every person who deliber-
ately aids or advises, or encourages another to commit suicide is 
guilty of a felony."28 
In 1983, the California Supreme Court noted three policy 
reasons for maintaining the assisted suicide statute. The first 
policy reason was that" '[s]tates maintaining statutes prohibit-
ing aiding . . . suicide, attempt to do so to discourage the ac-
23. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 433, 667 P.2d 1176, 1178, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163, 165 
(1983). 
24. Id., at 433, 667 P.2d at 1178, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 165. 
25. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1987). 
26.Id. 
27. Meier v. Ross General Hospital, 69 Cal. 2d 420, 424, 445 P.2d 519, 522-523, 71 
Cal. Rptr. 903, 906-907 (1968). The court reversed a decision in favor of the physician 
and remanded the wrongful death action for a new trial based on the theory that the 
physician had a duty to protect the patient from his own actions. This case involved a 
patient who was admitted by the patient's personal physician (who also was in charge of 
the psychiatric wing of the hospital) to the psychiatric ward of an acute care hospital 
because of his attempt to commit suicide by slashing his wrists. The patient subse-
quently committed suicide by diving out of the second floor window in his room. Id. 
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (Deering 1987). 
8
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tions of those who might encourage a suicide in order to advance 
some personal motives .... '''29 The second policy reason in-
volved the state's "'interests in the sanctity of life.' "30 The 
third policy reason for maintaining the assisted suicide statute 
was that there was no evidence that the aider and abettor suffers 
from mental illness.31 In 1959, the California Supreme Court had 
distinguished the difference between the crime of murder and 
the crime of assisted suicide. The Court stated that one who 
" 'actually performs, or actively assists in performing, the overt 
act resulting in death' " is guilty of murder.32 
In 1976, the California Legislature passed the Natural 
Death Act, which allows a terminally ill patient to execute what 
is commonly known as a "Living Will."33 Under the terms of a 
"Living Will," the patient signs a form entitled "Directive to 
Physicians" which directs the physicians to either withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining procedures (passive euthanasia}.34 In 
order for the directive to have effect, two physicians must make 
the determination that the patient has a terminal illness that, 
"regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, 
would, within reasonable medical judgement, produce death, and 
where the application of the life-sustaining procedures serve 
only to postpone the moment of death of the patient."311 
The Natural Death Act has been criticized as being vague, 
29. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 437, 67 P.2d 1176, 1181, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163,168 
(1983) (quoting Note, Criminal Aspects of Suicide in the United States, 7 N.C. CENT. 
L.J. 156, 162 (1975». 
30. Id. at 437, 667 P.2d at 1181, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 168. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 210.5 comment 5 (Official Draft & Revised Commentaries (1980». 
31. Id. at 437, 67 P.2d at 1181, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (quoting The Punishment of 
Suicide - A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 476 (1969». Modernly, debates re-
garding rational suicide focus on whether the person choosing suicide is rational. For 
further discussion see Conwell, RATIONAL SUICIDE AND THE RIGHT To DIE: -REALITY AND 
MYTH, 325 New Eng. J. of Med., 1100, Oct. 10, 1991. Dr. Conwell stating that the central 
issue is "the needs and values of the patients themselves" points to the critical require-
ment that the "person's judgement be intact." Id at 1101. Dr. Conwell further states, 
"For the discussion to proceed to the development of thoughtful and sensitive public 
policy, both the medical profession and the legislators must be better able to distinguish 
between people whose suicidal intent is clearly conceived and free of any distorting 
mental disturbances and people who are in need of psychiatric care." Id at 1102. 
32. People v. Matlock, 51 Cal. 2d 682, 694, 336 P.2d 505, 511 (1959) (quoting State 
v. Bouse,199 Or. 676, 702-703, 264 P.2d 800, 812 (1953». 
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West 1987). 
34.Id. 
35. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7186, 7187(e),(f) (West 1983). 
9
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limited, and unmanageable.36 In fact, the court in Bartling v. 
Superior Court,S? stated that the Natural Death Act was "so 
cumbersome that it is unlikely that any but a small number of 
highly educated and motivated patients will be able to effectuate 
their desires. "38 For these reasons the California Legislature 
looked for additional alternatives.3s 
In 1984, California adopted various changes to its Civil 
Code to provide for the durable power of attorney for health 
care.40 This law allows mentally competent adults to empower a 
non-medical individual to make terminal health care decisions 
on the patient's behalf in the event that the patient becomes 
incapacitated. This power includes the power to instruct the 
physician to withhold life-sustaining treatments.4l 
The Natural Death Act and the enactment of the durable 
power of attorney for health care do not authorize active eutha-
nasia.42 However, the California Legislature has rejected a strict 
application of religious doctrines regarding suicide by recogniz-
ing that there are times when a patient has the right to direct 
the timing of his or her death.43 In fact, the California Legisla-
ture through its findings and declarations recognized that artifi-
cial " . . . prolongation of life for persons with a terminal con-
dition may cause loss of patient dignity and unnecessary pain 
and suffering, while providing nothing medically necessary or 
beneficial to the patient."H The California Legislature stated 
that," . . . adult persons have the fundamental right to control 
the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, 
36. Special Project, The Right to Voluntary Euthanasia, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 489, 
508-509. 
37. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984) 
(quoting Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 
(1983)). 
38. [d. 
39. Smith, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Suicide or 
Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, at 331 (1989). 
40. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2400-2407 (West Supp. 1989). 
41. [d. 
42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7195 (West 1987). "Nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing, or to permit any affirma-
tive or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of 
dying as provided in this chapter." [d. 
43. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West 1987). 
44. [d. 
10
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including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures with-
held or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition."411 
C. SUICIDE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND 
AUTONOMY 
California case law has dealt with the person's right of pri-
vacy and autonomy with regard to suicide and assisted suicide. 
In 1983, the California Court of Appeals distinguished killing 
from a physician's letting someone die.46 The court stated, for 
the first time, that there is no duty to continue medical treat-
ment (continuation of an intravenous feeding) if, in the opinion 
of the physician, the treatment is unavailing.47 The court of ap-
peal focused on the prognosis of the patient resulting from the 
treatment rather than the traditional focus of ordinary versus 
extraordinary treatment, stating that 
even if a course of treatment might be extremely 
painful or intrusive, it would still be proportion-
ate treatment if the prognosis was for complete 
cure or significant improvement in the patient's 
condition. On the other hand, a treatment course 
which is only minimally painful or intrusive may 
nonetheless be considered disproportionate to the 
potential benefits if the prognosis is virtually 
hopeless for any significant improvement!8 
In 1984, the California Court of Appeal in Bartling v. Sup e.-
rior Court49 found that the right to disconnect life support sys-
tems was not limited to terminally ill or comatose patients. llo 
This case involved a 70-year-old man who suffered from multi-
ple nonterminal illnesses but who was not expected to live more 
45.Id. 
46. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 
(1983). The court concluded that," ... the cessation of 'heroic' life support measures is 
not an affirmative act but rather a withdrawal or omission of further treat-
ment . . . 'disconnecting' of mechanical devices is comparable to withholding the manu-
ally ad~inistered injection or medication. Further, we view the use of intravenous ad-
ministration of nourishment and fluid, under the circumstances, as being the same as the 
use of the respirator or other form of life support equipment." Id. 
47. Id., at 1016-1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. 491. "A physician has no duty to continue treat-
ment, once it has proved to be ineffective." Id. 
48. Smith, supra note 39 (citing and quoting Barber at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.) 
49. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 194-95, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224-
225 (1984). 
50. [d. 
11
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than a year.1I1 He had executed a "living will" which expressed 
his desire that medical care be terminated in the event he be-
came terminally ill and incompetent.1I2 In addition, he executed 
a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care granting his wife 
the power to make medical decisions in the event he became in-
competent.1I3 He also wrote out a formal declaration that he 
wished to end treatment knowing that his death would result, 
and he completed a form releasing the hospital and physicians 
from all liability connected to his decision to stop treatment.1I4 
The court, recognizing that the patient's right to autonomy 
is founded on the constitutional right of privacy, stated that 
" . . . if the right of the patient to self-determination as to his 
own medical treatment is to have any meaning at all, it must be 
paramount to the interests of the patient's hospital or doc-
tors."I111 The assertion that the state, in this particular situation, 
has interests in protecting against suicide was dismissed.1I6 The 
court held that the state's interest was only in protecting per-
sons from "'irrational self-destruction.' "117 The decision in 
Bartling appears to stand for the proposition that when one 
chooses to end one's life at an earlier point in time (versus pro-
longing the time of death through the use of a respirator) be-
cause treatment offers no hope, the decision does not fall within 
the legal definition of suicide or suicide assistance. 
51. [d. at 189, 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 220-221, 223. 
52. [d. at 190-191, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222. 
53. [d. at 191, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225. In addition, the court stated that the state's 
recognition of these rights is expressed in the Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1987), and in CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 70707(6) 
(1980). Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 194 & n.5, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224 & n.5. 
56. [d. at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E. 2d 417, 426 n.ll (1977)). 
[d. 
The interest in protecting against suicide seems to require lit-
tle if any discussion. In the case of the competent adult's re-
fusing medical treatment such an act does not constitute sui-
cide since (1) in refusing treatment the patient may not have 
the specific intent to die, and (2) even if he did, to the extent 
that the cause of death was from natural causes the patient 
did not set the death producing agent in motion with the in-
tent of causing his own death. 
57. [d. at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass 728, 370 N.E. 2d at p. 426 n.ll (1977)). 
12
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In 1986, the California Court of Appeal in Bouvia v. Supe-
rior Court/'s extended the right to refuse treatment to a woman 
suffering from cerebral palsy who was neither comatose, vegeta-
tive, nor suffering from a terminal illness. liB The court found that 
a person's own assessment of his or her quality of life is enough 
to justify the decision to withdraw a mechanical feeding device 
(nasogastric tubes). The court stated, 
It is not a medical decision for her physicians to 
make. Neither is it a legal question whose sound-
ness is to be resolved by lawyers or judges. It is 
not a conditional right subject to conditional ap-
proval by ethics committees or courts of law. It is 
a moral and philosophical decision that, being a 
competent adult, is hers alone.eo 
The court also reiterated that the right to refuse treatment was 
not an affirmative action which traditionally is characteristic of 
a suicide or an assisted suicide.61 The court's distinction between 
58. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1135, 1142-44, 225 Cal. Rptr. 
297, 299-300, 304-305 (1986). 
59. [d. 
60. [d., at 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305. 
61. [d., at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305-306. However, numerous ethicists and medical 
doctors disagree with this interpretation. 
Virtually all Americans now agree that the suffering of termi-
nally ill patients must end through the acceleration of the pa-
tient's death. The controversy today surrounds not the goal of 
death, but the means. Permitting the administration of a life-
terminating drug, if intended by the patient, is morally indis-
tinguishable from commonly acceptable practices of withhold-
ing or withdrawing life-sustaining technologies, including food 
and hydration, from a terminally ill patient, an action that 
will surely result in death. 
Gianelli, A right to die: Debate intensifies over euthanasia and the doctor's role, AM. 
MED. NEWS, 9, 15, Jan. 7, 1991 (quoting Sheldon F. Kurtz). 
Noting that we have relatively little trouble with passive eu-
thanasia, thinkers such as James Rachels have attempted to 
argue that there is no moral difference between letting people 
die and killing them. If we are prepared at a certain point to 
withhold further treatment, therefore, we should also be ready 
to take positive steps to hasten death. Understanding the 
moral equivalent of passive and active euthanasia should, in 
this way, expose the inconsistency of our beliefs and nudge us 
in the direction of a more rational policy in dealing with the 
bodies of people who lack both unconsciousness and the future 
prospect of it. 
Lachs, Active Euthanasia, 1 J. OF CLINICAL ETHICS, 113, Summer 1990. 
Decisions about nontreatment have an invisibility that deci-
sions about directly causing death do not have, even though 
13
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the right to refuse treatment and an affirmative act which is 
characteristic of suicide or assisted suicide is a subject of debate 
among the commentators. For example, one commentator stated 
that Bouvia "did not seek to refuse medical interventions she 
found personally intolerable; she sought to end her life because 
she found living intolerable."62 
Justice Compton, in a concurring opinion in Bouuia, focused 
on the right to die and not the right to refuse medical treatment. 
In so doing, Justice Compton came to the conclusion that this 
right includes the right to assisted suicide stating that, "[ t ]he 
right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own 
destinies so long as the rights of others are not affected. That 
right should . . . include the ability to enlist the help from 
others, including the medical profession, in making death as 
painless and as quick as possible. "63 
While the law continues to evolve, organized religion refuses 
to view suicide as an alternative under any circumstances. Mod-
ernly, the Catholic Church interprets the act of suicide as a "vio-
lation of the divine law."64 Likewise, contemporary Judaic and 
they may have the same result .... We often try to amelio-
rate these situations by administering pain medication or 
symptom control at the time we are withholding treatment, 
but these are all ways of disguising the fact that we are letting 
the disease kill the patient rather than directly bringing about 
death. But the ways diseases kill people are far more cruel 
than the way physicians kill patients when performing eutha-
nasia or assisting in suicide. Batlin, Euthanasia: The Way 
We Do It, The Way They Do It, 6 J. of Pain and Symptom 
Management, 18, 22, July 199L 
62. Annas, When Suicide Prevention Becomes Brutality: The Case of Elizabeth 
Bouvia, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1984, at 21; see also Kurtz, A Right to Die, AM. 
MED. NEWS, Jan. 7, 1991, 9, at 15 (stating, "The controversy today surrounds not the 
goal of death, but the means. Permitting the administration of a life-terminating drug, if 
intended by the patient, is morally indistinguishable from commonly accepted practices 
of witholding or withdrawing life-sustaining technologies, including food and hydration, 
from a terminally ill patient, an action that will surely result in death"). Kurtz, A Right 
to Die, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 7, 1991,9, at 15. 
63. Bouvia, at 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (Compton, J., concurring). 
64. For example, in 1990, Pope John Paul II stated, 
. . . No one is permitted to ask for this act of killing, either 
for himself or for herself or for another person entrusted to his 
or her care, nor can he or she consent to it [ ... I Nor can 
any authority legitimately recommend or permit such an ac-
tion. For it is a question of the violation of the divine law, an 
offense against the dignity of the human race, a crime against 
14
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Protestant doctrines reject suicide.61i Clearly, the recent Califor-
nia cases (Barber, Bartling, and Bouvia) do not reflect prevailing 
religious beliefs regarding suicide or what constitutes assisted 
suicide. 
life, and an attack on humanity. 
It may happen that, by reason of prolonged and barely tolera-
ble pain, for deeply personal or other reasons, people may be 
led to believe that they can legitimately ask for death or ob-
tain it for others. Although in these cases the guilt of the indi-
vidual may be reduced or completely absent, nevertheless the 
error of judgement into which the conscience falls, perhaps in 
good faith, does not change the nature of this act of killing, 
which will always be in itself something to be rejected. 
The Right to Voluntary Euthanasia, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 489, 522, n. 135. (1988) (quot-
ing The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, His Holiness Pope John Paul 
II, The Vatican's Declaration on Euthanasia, 1980). 
65. Marzen, supra note 10 at 20 (1985) (citing N. St. John-Stevas, THE RIGHT TO 
LIFE at 59 (1964». "The infrequency of suicide among the Hebrews, however, was most 
probably due to their religious creed's positive emphasis on the value of life and the 
special providence of God." [d. 
See also Steinfels, At Crossroads, U.S. Ponder Ethics of Helping Others Die, N. Y. 
Times, Oct. 28, 1991 at A2, col. 2. Rabbi David Bleich, a professor of Tulmeed and Eth-
ics at Yeshiva University stated, "Autonomy does not extend to one's own life. Man's 
body and life is the property of the creator." [d at A15. Rabbi Israel Reisner, chairman 
of the subcommittee on biomedical ethics for Conservative Judaism's Committee on Jew-
ish Law and Standards stated, "Assisted suicide and euthanasia are clearly unaccept-
able." [d. 
See also Marzen, supra note 10 at 20 (1985) (citing M.P. Battin, ETHICAL ISSUES IN 
SUICIDE at 31 (1982». "After the exile, prohibitions of suicide were included in the 
Rabbinic and Talmudic writings, expressed in stories and in mourning and funeral sanc-
tions." [d. See also Domini, Cohen, & Gonzalez, Jewish and Christian Attitudes on Sui-
cide, 20 J. RELIGION & HEALTH 203 (1981). Cf. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELI-
GION 367 (1966); 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 490 (1971). "Only for the sanctification of the 
name of the Lord would a Jew intentionally take his own life or allow it to be taken as a 
symbol of his extreme faith in God. Otherwise, intentional suicide would be strictly for-
bidden because it constitutes a denial of the Divine creation of man, of the immortality 
of the soul and of the atonement of death." [d. 
For Protestant opposition to suicide see 7 INTERPRETER'S BIBLE 592 (1951) which 
states, "no man has the right to play providence to his own life. [d.; 11 The NEW SCHAFF-
HERZOS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 132 (1964) which states, "The Christian 
Church has naturally condemned utterly an act which she cannot but regard as absolute 
negation of the fear of God and of trust in him, and as an insult alike to divine judge-
ment and to divine grace. It is, therefore, inadvisable to break down the barriers erected 
by law and custom against suicide, for such procedure would only invite greater laxity of 
public opinion." [d.; BAKER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 652 (1973) which indicates 
the Christian Church's opposition to suicide. See also C. Everett Koop, The Challenge of 
Definition, in Mercy Murder, and Morality: Perspectives on Euthanasia, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 1, 2 (Special Supplement, Jan./Feb. 1989). "To me, any such ambivalence 
[where the term euthanasia means "good death"] is inconsistent with the Judeo-Chris-
tian tradition within which I was raised, a tradition which, for me, places a consistent 
and primary emphasis on the supreme value of human life." [d. 
15
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D. EMERGING ATTITUDES: POLITICAL, PRIVATE, MEDICAL 
Secular institutions' attitudes regarding the issues of suicide 
and assisted suicide continue to evolve. In 1986, the Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association 
issued guidelines on the withholding and withdrawing of medical 
treatment. These guidelines are consistent with the Bartling de-
cision and the results of the President's Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research.66 
, 
The American Medical Association's position that active eu-
thanasia is contrary to the medical profession standards67 has 
been the subject of much debate, and that position may be shift-
ing.6s In fact, in May of 1988 the San Francisco Medical Society 
66. Smith, supra note 37 at 367-68. 
67. Rachels, Actiue and Passiue Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. p. 78 (1975) 
(citing a statement adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Medical Associa-
tion on Dec. 4, 1973 which states, " 'The intentional termination of the life of one human 
being by another - mercy killing - is contrary to that for which the medical profession 
stands and is contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association' "). Id. Note, 
however, that "the original Greek version of the [Hippocratic] Oath prohibits the physi-
cian from giving a deadly drug, even when asked for it; but the original version also 
prohibits performing surgery and taking fees for teaching medicine, neither of which 
prohibitions has survived into comtemporary medical practice." Batlin, Euthanasia: The 
Way We Do It, The Way They Do It, 6 J. of Pain and Symptom Management, 18,21, 
July 5, 1991. 
68. The Journal of the American Medical Association (while owned and published 
by the AMA is editorially independent) recently published an article, It's Ouer Debbie, 
259 J. A.M.A. 272 (1988) describing a mercy killing in order to provoke debate among the 
medical community and public. The following is a tailored description of the situation. A 
rotating gynecology resident injected 20 mg of morphine sulphate into a 20-year-old wo-
man who was dying of ovarian cancer. The 80-pound woman was having "unrelenting" 
vomiting as the result of an alcohol drip administered for sedation. She was suffering 
from severe air hunger, and was receiving nasal oxygen. She had suprasternal and inter-
costal retractions with her rapid inspirations. In addition, she was hooked up to an IV. 
She had not eaten or slept in two days. She had not responded to chemotherapy and was 
receiving supportive care only. Her only words to the resident were, "Let's get this over 
with." In a later editorial staff article, the author stated, 
[w]e believe that the JAMA is the right place for issues in 
American Medicine to be debated, and there is much to de-
bate. Technological prolongation of the dying process, the 
emotional and monetary costs of terminal illnesses, the costs 
and benefits of our lengthening life span, and the invasion of 
the bedside by lawyers and courts are only a few exam-
ples .... Despite traditional ethics and law, the medical 
profession may be pressured to confront the forbidden zone of 
active euthanasia head-on. We can ignore the pressure, we can 
decline to participate or even to discuss the subject, we can try 
16
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published the results of a survey distributed to its members re-
garding euthanasia.69 Seventy percent of the respondents stated 
that patients should have the option of requesting active eutha-
nasia when faced with a terminal illness.7o Forty-five percent of 
the respondents stated that they would carry out the patient's 
request for active, voluntary euthanasia.71 
A recent Louis Harris poll of 1,254 adults indicates that the 
majority of current public opinion believes in the patient's right 
of autonomy.72 The 1985 Louis Harris poll found that eighty five 
percent of those polled, "believed that a terminally ill patient 
'ought to be able to tell his doctor to let him die.' "73 Eighty-two 
percent believed this patient directive included the withdrawal 
of the mechanical feeding device.74 Note, however, that in 1988 a 
ballot initiative called the California liumane and Dignified Ini-
tiative failed to obtain the required number of signatures to 
to repress the movement and strive to prevent any alternative 
paths. Or we can consider the development of finite ethical 
guidelines in what may be seen as a continuum from type 1 to 
type 6, [previously in this article, the author offered six major 
types of euthanasia with examples] from passive to active eu-
thanasia, involving informed and consenting patients, [foot-
note omitted] close family members, appropriate religious ad-
visors, and knowledgeable, consenting physicians, all 
deliberating together over time with full disclosure and docu-
mentation. Pain and suffering, quality of life, productivity, 
and financial costs to individuals and society must be weighed 
together against perceived benefits of preventing death by 
prolonging dying. 
Lundberg, 'It's Over, Debbie' and the Euthanasia Debate, 259, J. A.M.A., 2142-2143 
(1988). More recently, the Journal of the American Medical Association published an 
article by Dr. Timothy Quill which evoked enormous discussion within the medical com-
munity and the nation as a whole. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized 
Decision Making, 324 J. A.M.A., 691 (1991). Dr. Quill prescribed barbiturates indicating 
the amount needed for sleep and the amount needed to commit suicide. Diane, the 
patient, was diagnosed with acute leukemia. Diane rejected the recommended course of 
chemotherapy which provided a 25% chance of recovery. Dr. Quill had a long standing 
relationship with Diane. Dr. Quill believed Diane's decision to commit suicide was rea-
sonable based on extended discussions with Diane and her family. No charges based on 
a grand jury finding were brought against Dr. Quill. 
69. Heilig, The SFMS Euthanasia Survey: Results and Analyses, SAN FRANCISCO 
MED., May, 1988 at 24-26. The survey generated a thirty-nine percent return rate and 
included viewpoints representing a wide range of religious affiliations. Id. 
70. Id. at 24. 
71. Id. at 25. 
72. G. Smith, supra note 39 at 367. 
73. Id. (citing Wallis, To Feed or Not to Feed, TIME, Mar. 31, 1986, at 60). 
74.Id. 
17
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qualify for the November 1988 ballot.711 The proposed initiative 
provided that medical doctors could practice active euthanasia 
(could provide a lethal injection to certain qualified patients).'78 
Two major reasons have been cited for the initiative's failure to 
attract the required number of signatures, "[t]oo little attention 
was paid to the organizational details of such a precedential en-
terprise and the measure's advocates took too much comfort in 
public opinion polls - both their own and others. "'77 Aside from 
the failure of the California Humane and Dignified Initiative to 
qualify for the ballot, other states continue to enact legislation 
enabling advanced directives, illustrating the trend toward em-
phasizing the primacy of individual autonomy and privacy 
rights.7s Today, many medical ethicists' opinions regarding as-
75. Parachini, The California Humane and Dignified Death Initiative, in Mercy, 
Murder and Morality; Perspectives on Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP., I, 10 (Spe-
cial Supplement, Jan./Feb. 1989). 
Id. 
To exercise the right to be killed by a doctor, a patient would 
have to be certifiably terminal. A durable power of attorney 
would be executed in which the patient conveyed authority to 
order his or her death to someone else in the event a comatose 
or otherwise mentally disabling condition ensued .... [T)he 
State Bar of California's Congress of Dele-
gates ... endorse[d) the plan, but the endorsement was not 
binding on the group as a whole. 
See infra note 8 which discusses why a similar initiative was defeated by Washing-
ton state voters in November of 1991. Paulson, Aid in dying initiative is rejected, Seat-
tle Post Intelligence, Nov. 6, 1991, at AI, col. 1. 
76. Parachini, supra note 76 at 10. 
77.Id. 
78. Fry-Revere, Legal Trends in Bioethics, J. OF CLINICAL ETHICS p. 88-89, (1990). 
An Ohio bill allowing people to designate a power of attorney 
for health care decisions if they should, at a later date become 
incompetent was signed into law on June 28, 1989. Similar 
laws were recently passed in Virginia, Oregon, Texas, and the 
District of Columbia. Minnesota has a new living will statute 
that went into effect on August I, 1989 . . . . North Dakota 
also has a new living will statute . . . . allows advance direc-
tives for health care only when the patient is terminally 
ill .... the act allows termination of feeding only if the food 
can not be 'physically assimilated' or if the procedure will be 
'unreasonably painful'.... Several states have also 
amended their living will statutes. Colorado's definition of life 
support that can be withheld or withdrawn now includes arti-
ficial feeding. Texas's definition of terminal illness now in-
cludes irreversible conditions. And Montana's statute contains 
a new provision prohibiting emergency medical personnel from 
acting contrary to a living will .... The Patient Self Deter-
mination Act, a bill requiring all states to have laws pertaining 
18
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sisted suicide are inconsistent with the current California law. In 
situations where the suicidal person has an underlying terminal 
and painful condition or is in an advanced state of decrepitude, 
medical ethicists assert that, "[p]hysicians and surrogates alike 
must be ready and willing to decide not to intervene in the dy-
ing process, indeed to hasten it, when they see the autonomy 
and dignity of patients threatened."79 Currently, some medical 
ethicists have argued that there is "no important moral differ-
ence" between active and passive euthanasia, thereby justifying 
active euthanasia in particular cases.80 
One of the principal arguments supporting the proposition 
that there is no intrinsic moral difference in a physician letting a 
patient die and killing that patient focuses on "motive, inten-
tion, and outcome."8} In cases involving patients who are suffer-
ing with HIV disease, physicians often decide to withhold treat-
ment in order to avoid the prolongation of pain and suffering. 
However, the motive to avoid pain and suffering must be taken 
to its logical conclusion. The withholding of treatment may 
cause the patient to suffer a relatively slow and painful death. 
Therefore, once the initial decision is made to not prolong the 
patient's pain and suffering, active euthanasia is preferable to 
passive euthanasia. Active euthanasia is preferable because ac-
tive euthanasia is consistent with the humanitarian motive to 
avoid pain and suffering in the case of a patient suffering from a 
terminal illness or condition. Arguably, the performance of ac-
[d. 
to advance directives in health care, was introduced in the US 
Congress jointly by Senators John C. Danforth (R-MO) and 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) on October 17, 1989. S1766 
requires medical institutions to inform patients of their right 
to make medical treatment decisions, including the right to re-
fuse treatment, as a condition of continued participation in 
federal Medicare and Medicaid programs. The bill also re-
quires that health care facilities ask patients whether they 
have written directives, that the wishes of patients be re-
corded and periodically reviewed, and that health care institu-
tions have bioethics committees to educate staff and the com-
munity on ethical issues and to provide guidance on specific 
cases. 
79. Miller, Death with dignity and the right to die: sometimes doctors have a duty 
to hasten death, 13 J. OF MED. ETHICS 81 (1987). 
80. Rachels, Active And Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 78 (1975). 
81. Kuhse, Active and Passive Euthanasia - Ten Years into the Debate, 1(2) Eu-
THANASIA REV. 108 (1986). 
19
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tive euthanasia on behalf of a person with advanced HIV disease 
does not constitute constructive assisted suicide (which ulti-
mately subjects the physician to criminal and civil sanctions in-
volving murder). Active euthanasia, in this situation, is a ra-
tional and humanitarian response to the patient's needs and 
desires. 
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Criminal sanctions may be brought against any person who 
participates in the suicide, rational or not, of a person with HIV 
disease. Criminal sanctions from murder in the first degree, to 
involuntary manslaughter, may be imposed against a person who 
participates directly in the death of the person with HIV dis-
ease. This type of participation is also known as a "mercy kill-
ing." Criminal sanctions may also be brought against a person 
who indirectly participates or assists a person to commit suicide, 
rational or not. In fact, California criminalized assisted suicide 
in 1873.82 This law has remained unchanged to this date and ap-
plies to any person who assists a person with HIV disease to 
commit suicide. This section examines these laws as well as their 
application to situations involving "mercy killings" and suicide 
assistance in the case of a person suffering from a severe or ter-
minal illness. 
A. HOMICIDE 
Under California Penal Code section 187(a), "[m]urder is 
the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice 
aforethought."83 According to section 189, first degree murder is 
the "willful, deliberate and premeditated," killing of another, all 
other kinds of murders [being] of the second degree.84 Section 
[d. 
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (Deering 1987). 
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering Supp. 1991). 
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Deering Supp. 1991). 
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive de-
vice or explosive, knowing use of ammunition designed pri-
marily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in wait, tor-
ture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing, or which is .committed in the perpetra-
tion of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, bur-
glary, mayhem, or any act punishable under Section 288, is 
murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murders are 
of the second degree. 
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192(a) states that voluntary manslaughter is "the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being without malice" but mitigated "upon a 
sudden quarrel or heat of passion."81i On the other hand, section 
192(b) declares that involuntary manslaughter is the product of 
a criminal, nonfelonious negligent act.8S Actually performing the 
event that ends the life of a person who has HIV disease falls 
within these various forms or definitions of homicide. 
In 1986, the Supreme Court of California in In re Joseph 
G., stated that 
the key to distinguishing between the crimes of 
murder and of assisting suicide is the active or 
passive role of the defendant in the suicide. If the 
defendant merely furnishes the means, he is 
guilty of aiding a suicide; if he actively partici-
pates in the death of the suicide victim, he is 
guilty of murder.87 
The court was merely reiterating the rule set forth in People u. 
Matlock, a 1959 California Supreme Court decision that active 
participation in the taking of a life is criminal homicide rather 
than assisting suicide.88 
B. EXCEPTIONS TO A MURDER CHARGE 
The only possible exception to a murder charge is a suicide 
pact where one of the two people in the pact survives and there 
is no indication of fraud. 89 Consent to homicide is no defense in 
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (Deering Supp. 1991). "Involuntary - in the commis· 
sion of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act 
which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circum· 
spection. This subdivision shall not apply to acts committed in the driving of a vehicle." 
Id. 
87. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 436, 667 P.2d 1176, 1180, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163, 167 
(1983). The court, however refused to apply this "literal formulation" to the facts of In 
re Joseph G. because the case involved a suicide pact (the intention was that both par· 
ticipants die) versus assisting a suicide (where only one person is intended to die). Id. 
88. Id., at 436, 667 P.2d at 1180, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (citing Matlock, 51 Cal. 2d at 
682, 336 P.2d at 505 (1959». The suicide victim was killed as a result of a direct injury 
(strangulation) that the defendant inflicted upon him. Id. 
89. In re Joseph G., supra note 87 at 439, 667 P.2d at 1182·83, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 169· 
70. A minor was charged with murder under California Penal Code section 187 and aid· 
ing and abetting under California Penal Code section 401. The minor entered into a 
suicide pact with a friend, Jeff W., also a minor. Joseph G. drove a car, which also con-
tained his friend, off a cliff. Only Joseph G. survived. The court held that the minor's 
actions fell more properly within the statutory definition of aiding and abetting a suicide 
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any jurisdiction in the United States.90 Therefore, aside from an 
unsuccessful suicide pact (which may trigger prosecution under 
California's aiding and abetting statute), a person who pulls the 
trigger, administers the lethal dose or smothers the person/pa-
tient with HIV disease is guilty of murder. However, as dis-
cussed in subsequent sections, it appears that the courts treat 
true "mercy killings" not as first degree murder but as lesser 
offenses. 
C. "MERCY KILLINGS": MODERN TREATMENT 
Between 1920 and 1983 there were only three convictions in 
the U.S. of criminal homicide which involved some aspect of as-
sisted suicide. All were convictions of manslaughter. 91 According 
to recent studies, the more appropriate homicide charge, if in 
fact one is brought, would be voluntary manslaughter. The the-
and not murder. Id. 
90. Sheffer, supra note 7, at 351. 
91. People v. Campbell, 124 Mich. App. 333, 336, 335 N.W.2d 27, 30 (1982). Most 
recently, Judge Gerald McNally of Oakland County District Court, Michigan, dismissed 
murder charges against Dr. Jack Kavorkian. Dr Kavorkian connected a 54-year-old wo-
man suffering with Alzheimer's disease to his homemade suicide machine. The judge 
held that the prosecutor had failed to prove that Dr. Kavorkian had planned and carried 
out the death of Janet Adkins. It was Janet Adkins who caused her own death when she 
pushed the button on the suicide machine. Dr. Kavorkian sat by her side and watched 
her die. Michigan has no assisted suicide laws. Four days after Janet Adkins' death, a 
civil injunction was imposed prohibiting Dr. Kavorkian from using his suicide machine 
on another patient. This case prompted another assisted suicide in Michigan. In August, 
Betram Harper, 72, of Loomis, California was charged with murder after flying to Michi-
gan so that his wife, Virginia, could commit suicide. His wife, Virginia, was 69 and was 
suffering from terminal breast cancer. Lewin, Judge Clears Doctor of Murdering Woman 
with a Suicide Machine, N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1990, at AI, col. 1. On Oct. 23, 1991 Dr. 
Kavorkian assisted two more women in killing themselves. Wilkerson, Rage and Support 
for Doctor's Role in Suicide, N. Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1991, at AI, col. 2. Sherry Miller, 43 
of Roseville, Michigan, had suffered the last twelve years of her life with mUltiple sclero-
sis. Ten months before her death she stated in a court hearing, "I went from a cane to a 
walker to a wheelchair. I can't walk. I can't write. It's hard for me to talk. I can't func-
tion as a human being ... What can anybody do? Nothing. I want the right to die." Id. 
Marjorie Wantz, 58 of Sodus, Michigan, had a "painful but non-terminal pelvic disease 
that reportedly left her unable to walk and unable to sleep for more than a couple of 
hours at a time," Id. Mrs. Wantz stated, "After three and one-half years I cannot go on 
with this pain and agony ... No doctor can help me anymore. If God won't come to 
me, I'm going to find God. I can't stand it any longer." Id. Dr. Kavorkian was indicted by 
a grand jury for the murder of Sherry Miller and Majorie Wantz and for the delivery of a 
controlled substance. Inuentor of Deuice for Suicide is charged with murdering 2, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 6, 1992, at A7, col. 1. Most recently, Dick Bauer of Cripple Creek, Colorado 
was acquitted of manslaughter "for giving his chronically ill mother the gun that she 
used to kill herself a few minutes later .... " Acquittal in Aided Suicide, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 15, 1992, at A5, col. 2. 
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that, although the death in fact was intended to 
occur as it did, it was under circumstances where 
the actor was not really in control of his own con-
duct. Certain psychological reports indicate that 
the act of assistance frequently is a response to 
pressures created by the victim's dependency or 
aggressiveness ... if of sufficient intensity, it 
ought to operate in the mitigation of the mental 
element prerequisite to murder.92 
459 
The trial courts in California seem to be following this formula. 
For example, in July of 1986 Thomas Baker of Martinez, Cali-
fornia, forced a nurse at gun point to disconnect his cancer 
stricken father's life support system. Baker pleaded guilty to a 
negotiated plea of voluntary manslaughter, receiving a sentence 
of not more than one year in jail and five years probation.93 In 
September of 1986 Orange County, California, prosecutors 
dropped a murder charge and recommended probation of Jay 
McFadden, who pleaded guilty to a lesser charge for the alleged 
"mercy killing" of his wife, who had been suffering from multi-
ple sclerosis.94 In January of 1986, Wallace Cooper of San 
Gabriel Valley pled guilty to a voluntary manslaughter charge in 
a "mercy killing" of his uncle (Cooper injected his uncle with a 
lethal dose of morphine and digoxin), who was suffering from 
three terminal illnesses: congestive heart failure, kidney failure, 
and chronic intestinal bleeding. Pasadena Superior Court Judge 
Coleman Stewart sentenced Cooper to five years probation, find-
ing that Cooper's actions were motivated by compassion and not 
malice.91i These cas·es indicate that where a true "mercy killing" 
can be established, the California courts will allow a lesser 
charge of voluntary manslaughter. However, as indicated above, 
the punishment varies; some pleas result in a probated sentence, 
while others result in incarceration. 
These decisions indicate that the courts look carefully at the 
condition of the patient and the motive of the mercy killer. 
While a murder charge is possible against a person who helps an 
92. Garbesi. The Law of Assistea Suicide. 3 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 97-98 (1987) [here-
inafter Garbesi). 
93. L.A. Times, July 11, 1986, at 28, col. 3. 
94. L.A. Times, Sept. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 5. 
95. L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1986, at 1, col. 1. 
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HIV disease patient commit suicide, voluntary manslaughter ac-
cording to the theory above is more likely. In this situation the 
condition of the person with HIV disease and the motive of the 
person charged with the crime may be distinguishable from the 
facts surrounding a first degree murder charge. 
D. IMPLICATIONS OF A "MERCY KILLING": ESTATE DISPOSITION 
The conviction, and perhaps even an acquittal of murder or 
voluntary manslaughter, may lead to other, noncriminal, legal 
repercussions. Section 250 of the California Probate Code states 
that 
[a] person who feloniously and intentionally kills 
the decedent is not entitled to ... [a]ny prop-
erty, interest, or benefit under the will of the de-
cedent, including any general or special power of 
appointment conferred by the will on the killer 
and any nomination of the killer as executor, 
trustee, or guardian made by the will . . . [The 
killer is also not entitled to] [a]ny property of the 
decedent by intestate succession.96 
Note that courts have interpreted section 254 of the California 
Probate Code, which was replaced by section 250,97 to mean that 
persons who plead to a lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter 
are still subject to the probate court's finding, that the killing 
was unlawful and intentiona1.98 In other words, the probate 
96. CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (Deering 1987). 
97. California Probate Code section 258 was effectively repealed on Jan. 1, 1985. 
The section stated that, "No person who has unlawfully and intentionally caused the 
death of a decedent . . . shall be entitled to any portion of the estate or to take under 
any will of the decedent .... A conviction or acquittal on a charge of murder or volun-
tary manslaughter shall be conclusive determination of the unlawfulness or unlawfulness 
of a causing of death, for the purposes of this section." CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (Deering 
1981). However, section 254 added by Stats. 1984, c. 527, section 3 and amended by 
Stats. 1989, c. 21, section 2, which is applicable to estates of decedents who died on or 
after Jan. 1, 1985, provides the same as section 258. Section 254 states that, "[AJ final 
judgement of conviction of felonious and intentional killing is conclusive . . .. In the 
absence of a final conviction . . . the court may determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence whether the killing was felonious and intentional .... " CAL. PROB. CODE § 254 
(Deering 1990). 
98. Estate of McGowan, 35 Cal. App. 3d 611, 111 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1973). Jean Mc-
Gowan shot and killed her husband and was charged with murder. Her attorney subse-
quently negotiated a plea of nolo contendere under California Penal Code section 1016 
(3)) to involuntary manslaughter under California Penal Code section 192(2). The court 
of appeal reversed the probate court's finding that," ... since respondent was acquit-
ted of the charge of murder by reason of her conviction of involuntary manslaughter, 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss3/1
1991] HIV DISEASE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 461 
court may, upon its own findings, determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence that a person is guilty of a felonious and inten-
tional killing. 
According to sections 250 and 254 of the California Probate 
Code, the finding of guilt by the probate court would result in 
the preclusion of succession to any part of the estate, whether 
intestate or by will. In 1973, the California Court of Appeal in 
Estate of McGowan99 held that a negotiated plea from murder 
to voluntary manslaughter will not preclude the probate court 
from making its own findings as to whether the evidence estab-
lishes beyond a reasonable doubt that a killing was unlawful and 
intentional. The court stated that "[t]he acquittal in such in-
stance (a conviction resulting from a nolo contendere or other 
bargained plea to a lesser offense) does not establish innocence 
of the greater crime charged, but merely means that the prose-
cution and the defendant have concluded that it is to their mu-
tual advantage not to proceed to the ordeal of a trial in the par-
ticular case. "100 
In addition, California's Probate Code section 254 provides 
the criteria for determining whether a killing was felonious and 
intentional. 101 California Probate Code indicates that even if 
there has been an acquittal for murder by the criminal court, the 
probate court may determine by a preponderance of the evi-
pursuant to the conclusive presumption of Probate Code section 258, she was entitled to 
succeed to all of the community property and one-half of the separate property (Prob. 
Code, § 223)." [d. at 615, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 42. The court of appeal held that where there 
is a plea of nolo contendere, the court must" . . . independently examine the facts in 
order to determine whether the defendant actually committed the offense alleged for the 
purposes of the particular proceeding (cf. Davis v. Aetna Insurance Company, 279 F. 2d 
304, 311)." [d. at 618, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45. 
99. [d. at 613-618, 111 Cal. Rptr. 39, 40-45. 
100. [d. at 619, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45. 
101. California Probate Code section 254 provides the criteria in determining 
whether the killing was felonious and intentional, stating: 
(a) A final judgement of conviction of felonious and inten-
tional killing is conclusive for purposes of this part. (b) In the 
absence of a final judgement of conviction of felonious and in-
tentional killing, the court may determine by a preponderance 
of evidence whether the killing was felonious and intentional 
for the purposes of this part. The burden of proof is on the 
party seeking to establish that the killing was felonious and 
intentional for the purposes of this part. 
CAL. PROD. CODE § 254 (Deering Supp. 1990). 
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dence whether the killing was felonious and intentional. lo2 In 
fact, the Court in McGowan stated that section 250 "clearly ... 
appl[ies] to persons who have not been convicted of anything or 
even charged."lo3 As a result, people who plead to involuntary 
manslaughter, or who have not been convicted of murder or even 
charged with murder, may be precluded from acting as the exec-
utor, trustee, or guardian of the decedent's will. Further, the 
person who has been found by the probate court to have unlaw-
fully killed, may be prevented from succession to any part of the 
estate whether succession occurs through the decedent's will or 
intestate. For example, if someone otherwise entitled to receive 
portions of the estate challenged the disposition, persons like 
McFadden, Baker, and Cooperlo. would be subject to the pro-
bate court's finding on whether or not there had been an unlaw-
ful and intentional killing. Note, however, that the type of sui-
cide assistance necessary to fall under section 250 calls for the 
assister to actually and intentionally perform the killing. There-
fore, persons who assist an HIV disease patient with suicide in 
the form of encouragement, or by the provision of "how to" in-
formation or the means, will probably not meet the requirement 
of an intentional killing. 
E. "MERCY KILLING:" EFFECT ON DISPOSITION OF INSURANCE 
In addition, the McGowan court held that section 258 (re-
placed by 250(b))'oll of the Probate Code also applies to insur-
ance proceeds. The court held that even if a beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy takes under contract and not through the es-
tate, public policy would dictate that the beneficiary be pre-
cluded from receiving the benefits. The court stated that 
" ... the rule that a beneficiary who unlawfully kills the in-
sured is precluded from recovering on the instrument (citations 
omitted) is not based solely on the Probate Code section 258, 
but has a much wider foundation rooted in public policy that 
102. McGowan, Cal. 3d, at 619, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45. 
103. [d. at 617, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 43. 
104. See text infra p. 21-23. 
105. California Probate Code section 258 was repealed by Stats. 1983, c. 842, section 
19, operative Jan. I, 1985. However, California Probate Code section 250(b) (added by 
statutes 1984, c. 527, section 3) serves to replace the intention to prevent insurance pro-
ceeds from passing to the person who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent, 
stating "Property appointed by the will of the decedent to, or for the benefit of, the 
killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent . . . . .. CAL. PROB. CODE § 
25!)(b) (Deering 1981). 
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prohibits the killer from obtaining title to property as the fruit 
of his crime (citation omitted)."lo8 In the event of a finding of an 
unlawful and intentional killing, the contingent beneficiaries 
would become entitled and, if none, then the proceeds become 
part of the insured's estate. In conclusion, sections 250 and 254 
of the California Probate Code would affect the disposition of 
any insurance proceeds. 
F. "MERCY KILLING" AND PHYSICIAN LIABILITY 
In California, physicians who comply with all the require-
ments of a "living will" (Natural Death Act) or durable power of 
attorney for health care will not be guilty of murder for the 
withdrawal or withholding of life-support systems of any nature, 
as previously discussed. lo7 Furthermore, in other states there are 
newspaper reports of acquittals of physicians who allegedly per-
formed the death-causing act. For example, a physician in New 
Hampshire who administered a fatal air embolism into the blood 
vessel of a carcinoma patient and a physician in New York who 
allegedly administered a fatal injection to a comatose patient 
were both acquitted of assisting-suicide charges. lOS A Michigan 
district court dismissed murder charges against Jack Kavorkian 
who provided the suicide victim with his homemade suicide 
machine. loe 
G. PROSECUTION UNDER THE AIDING AND ABETTING STATUTE 
While suicide itself is not a crime in California, assisted sui-
cide does constitute a crime. California has created a "sui 
generis crime of aiding and abetting suicide."llo California Penal 
Code section 401 states that, "[e]very person who deliberately 
aids, or advises, or encourages another person to commit ~uicide, 
is guilty of a felony."lll The California Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the issue of assisting the suicide of another person in 
106. McGowan, 35 Cal. 3d, at 615, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 43. 
107. See text infra p. 10. 
108. Engelhardt and Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal 
Sanctions, 36 Sw. L. J. 1003, 1029 (1982) (citing N.Y. Times Mar. 7, 1950, at I, col. 1. and 
Houston Chronicle, June 22, 1973, section 4, at 10, col. 1.). 
109. Lewin, Judge Clears Doctor of Murdering Woman with a Suicide Machine, 
New York Times, Dec. 14, 1991, at AI, col. 1. See infra note 91. 
110. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 434, 667 P.2d 1176, 1179, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163, 
166 (1983). 
111. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (Deering 1987). 
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two cases. In 1959, the Court in People v. Matlock held that 
section 401 did not apply where a " 'person actively performs or 
actively assists in performing the overt act resulting in 
death.' "112 The defendant strangled the victim at the victim's 
request because the victim desired death because he (victim) 
faced the possibility of imprisonment. The victim wished to ap-
pear as though he had been murdered for insurance purposes.1l3 
The court stated that section 401 " 'contemplates some par-
ticipation in the events leading up to the commission of the final 
overt act, such as furnishing the means for bringing about 
death,-the gun, the knife, the poison, or providing the water, 
for the use of the person who commits the act of self mur-
der.' "114 Under the court's analysis of section 401 in Matlock, 
providing the means or assisting in the administration of the 
means such as bringing the water to be used or holding the cup 
so that the person might drink from it, while not constituting a 
murder charge, would violate section 401. 
The California Supreme Court in In re Joseph G., held that 
the only exception to a murder charge is the true and mutual 
suicide pact (in a situation where one person survives the double 
suicide attempt).m In light of this ruling, a person with HIV 
disease who survives a double or mutual suicide attempt would 
be guilty of violating section 401 and not murder. 
112. People v. Matlock, 51 Cal. 2d 682, 694, 336 P.2d 505, 511 (1953) (quoting State 
v. Bouse, 199 Ore. 676, 702-03, 264 P.2d 800, 812, 823-25 (1953)). The court of appeal 
held that instructions based on California Penal Code section 401 (aiding and abetting a 
suicide) were properly refused. The defendant was charged with first degree murder. The 
defendant by his own account actively strangled and killed the victim. The trial was 
remanded primarily on evidentiary matters. Matlock, at 694, 698, 336 P.2d at 511, 515. 
113. Id. at 689-91, 336 P. 2d at 507. 
114. Id. at 694, 336 P.2d at 511. (quoting State v. Bouse, 199 Ore. 676, 702-03, 264 
P. 2d 800, 812, 823-25 (1953)). 
115. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d at 436, 67 P. 2d at 1180, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 1167. The 
court held that, 
. . . either (1) the mutual suicide pact in which one party pro-
vides the means (e.g., poison or lethal weapons) but each indi-
vidual kills himself independently pursuant to the agreement; 
or (2) the circumstances of the present case, in which the pact 
envisions both parties killing themselves. simultaneously with 
a single instrumentality. As will be seen, in both of the latter 
situations the proper criminal liability to be attached is for 
aiding and abetting suicide rather than for murder. 
Id. See infra pp.8-9 for discussion of the underlying policy reasons for CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 401. See infra p.20 for facts and further discussion of the case. 
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While it is clear that providing the means for or actively 
assisting in a' suicide constitutes a violation of section 401, it is 
not altogether clear what the test for encouragement is or 
whether providing "how to" information would violate section 
401. However, a 1988 civil case which discusses section 401 sheds 
some light on what may constitute a violation of section 401. 
The California Court of Appeal in McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,1l6 re-
iterated that some active and intentional participation in the 
events leading to the suicide are required in order to sustain a 
401 violation. The court stated, "To satisfy the burden of section 
401, defendants would have to (1) have specifically intended 
... [the victim's] suicide and (2) have had a direct participation 
in bringing it about."117 
The court held that a rock musician who records and dis-
seminates music whose lyrics encourage suicide does not specifi-
cally intend or directly participate in bringing a particular sui-
cide about, even, as in this case, where the victim listened to the 
music just before killing himself. The court stated that 
[i]t is not sufficient simply to allege that defend-
ants intentionally did a particular act. It must 
also be shown that such act was done with the in-
tent to cause injury [citation omitted]. In other 
words, plaintiffs would have to allege that defend-
ants intended to cause John's [victim] suicide and 
made the subject recorded music available for 
that purpose.l18 
The court stated, "There are no allegations of any kind that de-
fendants had any knowledge of, or intent with respect to, John 
himself or any other particular listener."1l9 
Applying the McCollum analysis, it would seem that section 
401 would not apply to two specific situations. The first situa-
tion involves an omission to act, for example, where a person 
suffering from HIV disease (who does not exhibit suicidal ten-
dencies) indicates that he or she believes in the concept of ra-
tional suicide and the listener does not disagree. The second sit-
116. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 1007, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 198 
(1988). 
117. [d. 
118. [d., at 1006, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 197. 
119. [d., at 106·107 n.12, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 197, n.12. 
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uation where it seems clear that section 401 would not apply, is 
where a person states hypothetically that they do not believe in 
damned souls as a result of rational suicide. For example, if a 
person says to an HIV disease sufferer (who does not exhibit sui-
cidal tendencies) that they do not believe that persons who com-
mit rational suicide have damned souls, section 401 would not 
apply. These acts in and of themselves would not show intent to 
cause the victim to commit suicide, nor is it likely that these 
acts would be construed as directly participating in assisting sui-
cide. Likewise, it would seem that informing a person of a book-
let such as that published by the Hemlock Society,120 which pro-
vides case histories of suicides including details of the methods 
used, would not constitute direct participation or intent to cause 
the victim to commit suicide.121 This fact pattern is very closely 
analogous to the situation in McCollum in that the provision of 
the material which discusses or encourages suicide is not pro-
vided with the specific intent to cause a particular suicide, as 
long as there is no knowledge of suicidal tendencies .. However, 
as noted above, the court's point, that the defendants did not 
have "any knowledge of, or intent with respect to John him-
self,"122 indicates that a person who knows of another's suicidal 
thoughts and has a substantial relationship with that person 
might have a duty to prevent the suicidal person from harming 
himself or herself. For example, if a lover, best friend, family 
member, or priest asserts that suicide under these conditions 
(AIDS-related suffering) is reasonable, the court may find that 
the close relationship gives rise to an intent because of the im-
plied influence of these persons on the victim. In addition, 
knowledge of a suicidal tendency will in all likelihood be easier 
to prove where there is a close relationship. While there are no 
cases on point providing any guidance as to the resolution of this 
particular fact pattern, McCollum, by analogy, indicates that 
these actions by lovers, best friends, family members and reli-
120. Golden, A Time to Die; Increasingly, the ill are turning to suicide out of hor-
ror at the expensive, intrusive, lonely, prolonged nightmare that so called natural 
death has become., The Boston Globe, Oct. 7, 1990, Sec. magazine, p.16. "The Hemlock 
Society which has 33,000 members and has sold more than 100,000 copies of its how to 
book, LET ME DIE BEFORE I WAKE, exalts suicide as a uniquely dignified and courageous 
way to die." Id. More recently the Hemlock Society has published "Final Exit", a best 
seller, which is a suicide manual. Steinfels, At Crossroads, U.S. Ponders Ethics of Help-
ing Others Die, N. Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1991, at Al col. 2. 
121. Suicide Guide to Be Published, The L.A. Daily J., Aug. 23, 1980, col. 3, p.2. 
122. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1007, n.12, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 197, n.12. 
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gious counsel could be considered within the aiding and abetting 
statute prohibiting the encouragement of suicide. 
IV. CIVIL LIABILITY 
A. TYPES OF LAWSUITS BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF DECEASED 
Absent a statute (e.g., wrongful death or survivorship ac-
tions), common law dictates that there is no personal cause of 
action for the death of an individual.123 Under common law, the 
death of the individual terminated all actions the deceased could 
have brought for tortious conduct.124 California, by statute, pro-
vides for two distinct causes of action, the wrongful death ac-
tion12Ci which does not provide punitive damages and the survi-
vorship action which provides punitive damages. 126 However, it 
should be noted that because of the diminished life expectancy 
of persons with HIV disease, pecuniary damages, which are 
based on the loss of value which the surviving relatives would 
have received from the decedent had the decedent not been 
killed, will be uniquely limited. Also, depending on the condition 
of the person with HIV disease and the assister's motives, the 
public may not be willing to impose punitive damages against 
the person who assists a suicide or participates in a "mercy 
killing." 
California Civil Procedure Code section 377 provides for an 
original and distinct claim for wrongful death brought by the 
deceased person's beneficiaries such as the spouse, parent, or 
child.127 This action is brought against the person whose negli-
123. Knuth, Ciuil Liability for Causing or Failing to Preuent Suicide, 12 Loy. LAL. 
REV. 967, 968 (1979) (citing W. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS § 126, at 898 (4th ed. 1971)) 
[hereinafter Knuth]. 
124. Id. 
125. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (Deering 1987). 
126. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (Deering 1987). 
127. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (Deering 1987). Section 377(b) defines heirs as: 
(1) Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the 
property of the decedent according to the provisions of Part 2 
(commencing with Section 6400) of Division 6 of the Probate 
Code, (b) Whether or not qualified under paragraph (1), if 
they were dependent on the decedent, the putative spouse, 
children of the putative spouse, stepchildren, and par-
ents .... and (3) Minors, whether or not qualified under 
paragraphs (1) or (2), if , at the time of the decedent's death, 
they resided for the previous 180 days in the decedent's house-
31
McCoy: HIV Disease and Assisted Suicide
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
468 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:437 
gent or willful conduct caused the death. 128 Because the statute 
focuses on the wrong to the beneficiaries, the damages are lim-
ited to pecuniary 10sses.129 Damages for the survivor's emotional 
distress are not recoverable. ISO In addition, punitive damages are 
not recoverablels1 except where provided through consolidation 
of a survivorship action.1s2 
Pecuniary losses suffered by the surviving relatives include 
the loss of the value of the companionship, support services, and 
contributions which the survivors would have received from the 
victim had death not occurred. These losses would be calculated 
relative to that person's life expectancy. These losses would be 
limited due to the short life expectancy of a person with an HIV 
disease diagnosis. Current medical evidence indicates that most 
deaths occur within two years of an AIDS diagnosis. 133 For ex-
ample, if the person with HIV disease was at the end stages of 
the disease, these losses would be far less than those losses cal-
culated for a person who has just been diagnosed with HIV 
disease. . 
California Probate Code section 573 provides that the exec-
utor or administrator of the estate may bring an action for dam-
[d. 
hold and were dependent upon the decedent for one-half or 
more of their support. 
128. CAL. PROB. CODE § 377(a) (Deering 1981). 
129. Knuth, supra note 123 at 968 (citing Reyna v. City of San Francisco, 69 Cal. 
App. 3d 876, 880, 138 Cal. Rptr. 504, 507 (1977)). 
130. [d., (citing Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 72, 562 P.2d 1022, 1028, 137 Cal. 
Rptr. 863, 869 (1977)). 
131. [d., (citing Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 462, 113 Cal. 
Rptr. 416, 424 (1974)). 
[d. 
132. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377(a) which states, 
In every action under this section, such damages may be given 
as under all the circumstances of the case, may be just, but 
shall not include damages recoverable under Section 573 of 
the Probate Code . . . . Any action brought by the personal 
representative of the decedent pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 573 of the Probate Code may be joined with an action 
arising out of the same wrongful act or neglect brought pursu-
ant to the provisions of Section 573 of the Probate Code, such 
actions shall be consolidated for trial on the motion of any 
interested party. 
133. Chaisson, Living with AIDS, 263 J. A.M.A. 434 (1990). 
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ages sustained prior to death. 134 The damages recoverable in-
clude compensatory and punitive or exemplary but not damages 
for pain, suffering, or disfigurement. 1311 Punitive damages are 
over and above those which would compensate the plaintiff for 
the pecuniary loss. Punitive damages are based on the public 
policy that the defendant's conduct is outrageous and must be 
punished proportionately, thereby making an example of the de-
fendant in addition to providing solace to the plaintiff.136 
Because there are no civil cases involving assisting suicide, 
it is difficult to predict whether or to what extent punitive dam-
ages would be imposed on the defendant. The two criminal cases 
of physician acquittaP37 indicate that the public does not con-
sider the actual performance of the death-causing act on a per-
son suffering from terminal illness to be outrageous conduct.13s 
Because HIV disease is currently considered a painful and dis-
figuring terminal illness, juries in California may likewise not 
impose punitive damages if the defendant can establish that his 
or her motive was not for personal gain but was derived from 
compassion. 
B. NEGLIGENCE PER SE: PENAL CODE SECTION 401 VIOLATION 
Under certain circumstances, violations of criminal statutes 
subject the defendant to civil as well as criminalliability.139 The 
terms of a statute in essence create a specific duty of care, and 
when the statute is violated the duty is deemed to have been 
breached, giving rise to the term "negligence per se".140 In 1967, 
the California Legislature codified the doctrine of negligence per 
se as a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof. HI 
134. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (Deering 1987). 
135. Knuth, supra note 123 at 969 (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West 1956) 
(amended 1961». 
136. w. PROSSER and P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, 9-10 (5th ed. 1984). 
137. Engelhardt and Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal 
Sanctiqns, 36 Sw. L. J. 1003 (1982) (citing N.Y. Times Mar. 7, 1950, at 1, col. 1. and 
Houston Chronicle, June 22, 1973, section 4, at 10, col. 1.) 
138. See text infra p. 26. 
139. W. PROSSER and P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, 220 (5th ed. 1984). 
140. [d. at 220, n. 2. 
141. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (Deering 1986). 
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if: 
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public 
entity; (2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to 
person or property; (3) The death or injury resulted from an 
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However, California courts have not as yet determined whether 
section 401 (the prohibition against aiding and abetting a sui-
cide) would provide the basis for a negligence per se private 
right of action against a person who assisted a suicide. 
While most negligence per se cases involve violations of the 
Vehicle Code,142 the doctrine is not limited to these types of vio-
lations. In 1988, the Court of Appeal in McCollum refused to 
decide or discuss whether section 401 would entitle the plaintiffs 
to a jury instruction on negligence per se because section 401 
was not applicable to the victim's suicide.143 However, in 1984, 
the California Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's summary 
judgment and instead held that "verbal encouragement to com-
mit assault with a deadly weapon [is] affirmative conduct suffi-
cient, as a matter of law, to impose civil liability for damages 
ensuing from that assault."144 Michael R. v. Jeffrey B. was an 
action on behalf of a minor who was shot in the eye with a mar-
ble. The defendant told the boy who shot the marble at the 
plaintiff, "Hey, shoot; go for it."14!! By analogy, an analysis of the 
statute (section 401) indicates that a violation of section 401 
would likely entitle plaintiffs to a jury instruction of negligence 
per se. 
~ I 
I 
In order for a criminal statute to establish a specific duty of 
care for civil negligence, the following requirements must be 
[d. 
occurrence of the nature which the statute was designed to 
prevent; and (4) The person suffering the death or the injury 
to his person or property was one of the class of persons for 
whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was 
adopted. (b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that: 
(1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation 
did what might be reasonably expected of a person of ordinary 
prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to 
comply with the law; or (2) The person violating the statute, 
ordinance, or regulation was a child and exercised the degree 
of care ordinarily exercised by persons of his maturity, intelli-
gence, and capacity under similar circumstances, but the pre-
sumption may not be rebutted by such proof if the violation 
occurred in the course of an activity normally engaged in only 
by adults and requiring adult supervision. 
142. WITKIN, TORTS § 531. 
143. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d n.13, at 1007, 249 Cal. Rptr. n.12 at 197. 
144. Michael R. v. Jeffrey B., 158 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 1063-1064, 205 Cal. Rptr. 312, 
316 (1984). 
145. [d. at 1064, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 316. 
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met: (1) the statute itself must be clear and unambiguous; (2) 
the legislative purpose must have been to prevent the type of 
injury actually suffered by the plaintiff (here the decedent); and 
(3) the legislature must have intended to protect a class of per-
sons of which the plaintiff (decedent) is a member.14s In addi-
tion, California Evidence Code section 669(a)(1),(2) requires 
that the plaintiff prove that the statute was violated and that 
the violation proximately caused the death or injury. 147 
In light of the above, the. first element or question in deter-
mining if a violation of California Penal Code section 401 can 
lead to a civil action based on negligence per se is whether the 
statute is clear and unambiguous. The statute imposes the duty, 
defines the conduct, and specifies of whom it is required.Hs The 
statute imposes the duty on "every person".149 The conduct is 
defined as one who "deliberately aids, or advises, or encourages 
another person to commit suicide."lCio Thus, at first glance it 
would appear that this element meets the test necessary for the 
application of the negligence per se doctrine. However, one could 
argue that section 401 is ambiguous and vague. It is unclear as 
to what constitutes the act of deliberately aiding, or advising, or 
encouraging another person to commit suicide. There are many 
possible scenarios. The types of suicide assistance a person can 
provide vary from the seemingly innocent to what appears at 
first glance to be murder. lCil As a result, some acts may not con-
146. W. PROSSER and P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, 222-227 (5th ed. 1984). 
147. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a)(I), (2) (Deering 1986). 
148. California Penal Code SECTION 401 states, "Every person who deliberately aids, 
or advises, or encourages another person to commit suicide, is guilty of a felony." CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 401 (Deering 1987). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. In order to illustrate the difficult question of what constitutes suicide assis-
tance and the imposition of criminal and civil liability the varying degrees of assistance 
are divided below into five categories. 1. ENCOURAGEMENT: First, the assister recog-
nizes that the AIDS patient is considering suicide. Encouragement is possible by the 
passive act of simply not disagreeing or by active reassurance. For example, reassurance 
occurs by the listener simply stating that the listener understands or that the listener 
doesn't believe that the patient's soul will be damned forever. Encouragement by omis-
sion is basically the absence of discouragement. 2. PROVISION OF "HOW TO" INFOR-
MATION: This can be accomplished by directly providing or referring to literature on 
"how to" commit suicide. 3. PROVIDING THE MEANS: This can be accomplished, for 
example, by intentionally or unintentionally providing a gun or a sufficient amount of 
medication to a person who objectively appears suicidal. 4. ASSISTING IN THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF THE MEANS: This could be accomplished by holding a cup of 
water to the patient's mouth enabling that person to swallow a lethal dose. Another ex-
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stitute aiding, or advising, or encouraging another person to 
commit suicide. 
The second element or question in determining if a viola-
tion of California Penal Code section 401 can lead to a civil ac-
tion based on negligence per se is whether the legislative pur-
pose is to prevent the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff. 
The legislature made the violation of section 401 a felony of-
fense. The criminal punishment of the offense was meant to 
" ... discourage the actions of those who might encourage sui-
cide."1~2 Therefore, if an individual deliberately aids, advises, or 
encourages a person with HIV disease to commit suicide, which 
as a result occurs, then that injury (the suicide) is what the leg-
islature meant to prevent by the provision of the statute. As a 
result, it appears that the second element necessary for the ap-
plication of the negligence per se doctrine to Penal Code section 
401 is met. 
The third element or question, in determining if the negli-
gence per se doctrine may be applied to a violation of Penal 
Code section 401, is whether the legislature must have intended 
to protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff (deceased) 
is a member. Because the aiding and abetting statute is designed 
to protect persons from committing suicide, any person who 
commits suicide as a result of encouragement from another is 
within the class of persons the legislature sought to protect. 
California holds that the violation of a statute creates a re-
buttable presumption of negligence. m Even if the presumption 
ample would include helping the person to the garage where the patient ultimately dies 
of carbon monoxide poisoning. 5. ACTUALLY PERFORMING THE ACT WHICH 
ENDS THE PATIENT'S LIFE: Upon the request of the patient (usually where the pa-
tient is physically incapable of accomplishing the act), the person/assister actually per-
forms the act such as pulling the trigger of the gun, administering a lethal dose (ie. 
intravenously) or by smothering. These stages are those defined in Criminal Liability 
For Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. at 358. However, the definitions were tailored 
. for the purposes of this article. 
152. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal.3d 429, 437, 67 P.2d 1176, 1181, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163,168 
(1983) (quoting Note, Criminal Aspects of Suicide in the United States, 7 N.C. CENT. 
L.J. 156, 162 (1975)). 
153. Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School District, 29 Cal. 2d 581, 588, 177 P.2d 279, 
283 (1947). "An act which is performed in violation of an ordinance or statute is presum-
ably an act of negligence, but the presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted by 
showing that the act was justifiable or excusable under the circumstances. Until so rebut-
ted it is conclusive." [d. This holding is consistent with a later adopted code, CAL. EVID. 
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is not rebuttable, in certain circumstances, a statutory violation 
may be excused. In 1958, the California Supreme Court held 
that a person may be excused for the violation of a statute if "he 
has sustained the burden of showing that he did what might rea-
sonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting 
under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the 
law."I1!4 Some guidance as to what constitutes an excuse may be 
found in the Restatement of Torts, Second (1965) which pro-
vides for the following excuses: 
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the ac-
tor's incapacity; (b) he neither knows or should 
know of the occasion for compliance; (c) he is un-
able after reasonable diligence to comply; (d) he is 
confronted by an emergency not due to his own 
misconduct; (e) compliance would involve a 
greater risk of harm to the actor or to others.lGG 
The actor's incapacity may provide the excuse in the case of 
assisting the suicide of a person suffering from a terminal illness. 
As previously discussed,1I16 where, "the act of assistance. . . 
[was] in response to pressures created by the victim's depen-
dency or aggressiveness, if of sufficient intensity it may establish 
lack of capacity."167 Therefore, the persons who could assert this 
excuse would be those who could establish a very close and sub-
stantial relationship with the victim such as a spouse or signifi-
cant other (e.g., gay lover, Shanti worker). It is unlikely that any 
of the other acceptable excuses for violating a statute provided 
above would apply to the circumstances surrounding a HIV dis-
ease-related suicide. One could argue that the release from pain 
and suffering would fall within subsection (e), in that compli-
ance with Penal Code section 401 would result in greater harm 
to the deceased and others. As yet, the courts have not consid-
ered that the release from pain and suffering would constitute 
CODE § 669. See infra note 125. 
154. Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897, 900 (1958). See also, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Martin v. Martin 82 Cal. 2d, 733, 187 P.2d 78 (citing Satterlee v. 
Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d, 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947) which stated, "A pre-
sumption of negligence arises from the prima facie showing, which must be rebutted by 
evidence that the violation was justifiable or excusable"). Martin v. Martin 82 C.A. 2d, , 
733, 187 P.2d 78 (1947). 
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965). 
156. See text infra p. 458. 
157. Garbesi, supra note 92 at 97-8. 
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an excuse. 
Causation in fact and proximate cause will be less difficult 
to establish where the person provided the means or assisted in 
the administration of the means which caused the death of the 
HIV disease patient. On the other hand, it will be much more 
difficult to establish that a person who provides "how to" infor-
mation or who encourages suicide by verbal support (or omission 
to discourage suicide) was the cause of the victim's death. 
Reliance on the knowledge and theories of psychiatrists will 
aid in making the determination whether or not the defendant's 
conduct was the substantial cause of the victim's suicide. The 
current literature illustrates that suicide is the result of internal 
processes and that external events are not the substantial cause 
of the suicide but are merely incidental or precipitating. IIi 8 
Based on this determination, imposing liability on any particular 
person who stated that he or she believed in rational suicide or 
did not discourage rational suicide, by analogy would be inap-
propriate. In fact, Prosser states that "[a]n act or an omission is 
not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would 
have occurred without it."11i9 Therefore, if the defendant estab-
lishes that his or her conduct was not the substantial cause of 
the suicide, then the plaintiff's case would fail. 
However, if the plaintiff does establish cause in fact, then 
the final step is proof that the defendant's conduct was the 
proximate cause of the victim's injury (suicide). Because the im-
mediate cause of the suicide is the victim's own action, the criti-
cal question is whether the victim's act is an independent or de-
pendent intervening act.160 If the victim's act is considered a 
158. Civil Liability for Causing or Failing to Prevent Suicide, supra note 112 at 
970-971. 
159. Civil Liability for Causing or Failing to Prevent Suicide, supra note 25, at 972 
(quoting W. PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS, § 41 at 238 (4th ed. 1971)). 
160. [d. at 974. 
Proximate cause is an issue in any tort action, but it is partic-
ularly important when the defendant's conduct was not the 
immediate cause of injuries. Since the immediate cause of 
death in one who commits suicide is his own action, suicide is 
an act that intervenes between the defendant's negligence and 
the injured person's death. Intervening acts [footnote omitted) 
are classified as either dependent or independent under gen-
eral tort principles. A dependent intervening act does not in-
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dependent intervening act, then the defendant's (person assist-
ing suicide) acts are treated as the proximate cause of the vic-
tim's harm.161 If the victim's act is considered an independent 
intervening act, then the chain of causation has been interrupted 
and the defendant is not the proximate cause of the victim's 
injury. 162 
The court of appeal in Schrimsher v. Bryson stated," The 
general test of whether an independent intervening act, which 
operates to produce an injury, breaks the chain of causation is 
the foreseeability of that act."163 In 1960, the California Court of 
Appeal in Tate v. Cononica, stated in dicta that a voluntary sui-
cide (not the result of an "uncontrollable impulse") might be 
considered an independent intervening act which would break 
the chain of causation.164 The question of proximate cause will 
Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
terrupt the chain of causation and the defendant's conduct re-
mains the proximate cause of the harm sustained by the 
plaintiff [footnote omitted). An independent intervening act 
supersedes the defendant's conduct as the cause in fact of the 
plaintiff's injuries and relieves the defendant of liability [foot-
note omitted). 
163. Id. at 975 n,42 (quoting Schrimsher v. Bryson, 58 Cal. App. 3d 660, 664, 130 
Cal. Rptr. 125, 127 (1976)). 
Id. 
164. Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 915, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 40 (1960). 
[T)hat where the negligent wrong only causes a mental condi-
tion in which the injured person is able to realize the nature of 
the act of suicide and has power to control it if he so desires, 
the act becomes an independent intervening force and the 
wrongdoer cannot be held liable for the death. On the other 
hand, if the negligent wrong causes mental illness which re-
. suits in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, then the 
wrongdoer may be held liable for the death . . . . [T)he dece-
dent's act must be voluntary, in the sense that he could, in 
spite of his mental illness, have decided against suicide and 
refrained from killing himself. 
But note, the court stated, 
Id. 
Where defendant, intended by his conduct, to cause serious 
mental distress or serious physical suffering, and such mental 
distress is shown to be a "substantial factor in bringing about" 
(Rest., Torts sections 279, 280) the suicide, a cause of action 
for the wrongful death results, whether the suicide was com-
mitted in a state of insanity. or in response to an irresistible 
impulse. or not. 
Ta!e was an action alleging intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. De-
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depend on whether at the time of the defendant's conduct, the 
defendant could foresee that the victim was suicidal. The answer 
to the question will depend on the particular facts of the situa-
tion. Note that the level of dependency may weigh heavily on 
whether the defendant's act was the cause of the suicide. For 
example, foreseeability may be more easily established where 
the defendant is the primary caregiver to the person who com-
mits suicide. In this situation, defendant's knowledge of suicidal 
tendencies may be successfully imputed through circumstantial 
evidence. It is clear, however, that if the victim tells the defend-
ant that he or she is contemplating suicide and the defendant 
then provides the suicide victim with poison, then foreseeability 
has been firmly established. 
Because the court requires foreseeability of the intervening 
act (victim's suicide), it is unlikely that courts today will hold 
'persons responsible for a victim's act if they did not have the 
direct knowledge of the victim's suicidal tendencies. 1811 For ex-
ample, it is unlikely that persons will be held responsible be-
cause of implied inferences of suicidal tendencies which may be 
drawn from a conversation with a person with HIV disease who 
asks another what they think (ethically) of suicide or what liter-
ature is available on the subject of suicide. 
C. NEGLIGENCE: NONPROFESSIONAL 
The court of appeal, in McCollum v. CBS, Inc., stated that 
the threshold question in determining whether there is a claim 
for negligence is whether there is any duty owed to the plaintiff. 
The court stated that foreseeability was only one of several fac-
tors to be weighed in determining whether a duty is owed.188 
The Supreme Court in Nally/87 listed succinctly the other fac-
tors which include: 
... the degree of certainty that [he] suffered in-
jury; the closeness of the connection between the 
[defendant's] conduct and the injury suffered; the 
moral blame attached to the [defendants]: the 
fend ants by their conduct caused a person serious mental distress which resulted in that 
person committing suicide. Id. 
165. Knuth, supra note 123 at 975, n.42, (quoting Schrimsher v. Bryson, 58 Cal. 
App. 3d 660, 664, 130 Cal. Rptr. 125, 127 (1976)). 
166. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1004, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 195. 
167. See text infra p. 479. 
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policy of preventing future harm; the extent of 
the burden to the [defendants] and the conse-
quences to the community of imposing liability 
for the breach; and the availability, cost, and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 188 
477 
The court in McCollum 169 held that the plaintiffs failed to 
establish that the defendants had a duty.l7O This case involved a 
rock musician (and others involved in writing and distribution) 
who recorded music whose lyrics encouraged suicide.l7l The vic-
tim shot and killed himself while listening to defendant's mu-
sic.172 The court held that the victim's suicide was not reasona-
bly foreseeable, that there was no close connection between the 
defendants' music production and distribution and the teen-
ager's death, that no moral blame could be imputed to the de-
fendants, and, most significantly, that the imposition of a duty 
which would restrict artistic speech is unacceptable. 173 This case 
provides support for the First Amendment right to distribute 
material such as that of the Hemlock Society in light of the fact 
that the court has found no duty to exist between the writer, 
publisher, or distributor and an unknown suicide victim who lis-
tens to or reads the material before killing him/herself. 
However, the factors announced in determining whether 
there is a duty must be carefully scrutinized in light of the situa-
tion surrounding a person with HIV disease who commits sui-
cide. For example, a lover, family member, or friend who inad-
vertently makes a death-causing agent available to a suicidal 
person may be found to have not only had a duty of care (to 
prevent harm) but to have breached that duty. A special rela-
tionship, which by its nature creates a duty, may arise, as a re-
sult of the family relationship or in assuming the role of a care 
provider for that individual. For example, the more dependent 
the person with HIV disease is on the care provider the more 
likely a special relationship will be imposed. 
168. Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal.3d 278, 293, 763 P.2d 948, 956, 253 
Cal. Rptr. 97, 105 (1988) (citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
97, 443 P. 2d 561 (1968». 
169. See text infra p. 465. 
170. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1005-06, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 196-97. 
171. [d. at 994, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 189. 
172. [d. at 995, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 189. 
173. [d. at 1005-06, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 197. 
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In light of the fact that society's attitudes are changing re-
garding the rational suicide of a terminally ill person, the public 
policy of preventing suicide may change as well. However, as a 
matter of law, the court would probably find a duty due to the 
presence of a special relationship of custody or control and the 
current public policy to prevent suicide. 
D. BRIEF DISCUSSION: OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
1. Professional Negligence of Physicians 
The general principles which ordinarily govern in negligence 
cases also apply in medical malpractice claims. The duty to pre-
vent a foreseeable suicide may arise out of a special relationship 
between the suicidal person and his or her physician. Therefore, 
as in any other case founded upon negligent conduct, the burden 
of proof rests on the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to 
show a lack of the requisite skill or care on the part of the de-
fendant. The standard applied in medical malpractice cases 
must take into account the specialized knowledge or skill of the 
defendant physician. l74 
Through the use of expert testimony, the plaintiff must 
prove that the physician breached his or her duty to prevent sui-
cide. The plaintiff must show that the treating physician's par-
ticular act or omission to act was not within the standard of care 
among other competent physicians. By analogy, a physician who 
prescribes medications in potentially lethal dosages to a person 
known to be suicidal, such as a person with HIV disease, would 
in all probability be found to have breached his or her duty. 
This is a likely result if it can be established that the physician 
knew or should have known of the victim's suicidal tendency. 
In addition, a physician (psychiatrist) who treats a patient 
on an out-patient basis, and who has knowledge that the patient 
is likely to attempt suicide, has a duty to take reasonable steps 
to prevent the harm, and failure to do so will subject the psychi-
atrist to a medical malpractice action. For example, a physician 
who knows that his or her patient is in imminent danger of com-
mitting suicide has a duty to prevent such an action, whether it 
174. McCoid, The Care Required Of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 
549,558 (1959); w. PROSSER, TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971). 
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be by commitment to an institution or some other type of ap-
propriate treatment. In 1978, the California Court of Appeal in 
Bellah u. Greenson stated that the precautionary steps that 
could or should have been taken by a psychiatrist treating a per-
son with known suicidal tendencies presented a purely factual 
question to be resolved by a jury.l7II 
There may be some circumstances where the plaintiff does 
not have to use expert witnesses to show a breach of duty and 
may instead rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. u8 The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Meier u. Ross, reversed a judgment in 
favor of the physician and remanded for a new trial the wrongful 
death action by the patient's widow and minor children. I?? The 
physician (psychiatrist) admitted the patient after a suicide at-
tempt to a psychiatric wing of the hospital where he was in 
charge. The patient subsequently jumped to his death through 
an open window.178 The court held that a jury instruction of res 
ipsa loquitur was proper because the duty required that the phy-
sician protect the decedent from his own acts whether voluntary 
or involuntary.179 Once the breach is established, the plairitiff 
would have to prove additional elements of causation in fact and 
proximate cause.180 
2. Special Duty: Religious Counsel Malpractice 
In 1988 the California Supreme Court in Nally u. Grace 
Community Church 181 refused to impose a duty on all nonther-
apists to refer potentially suicidal persons to licensed medical 
practitioners.182 The supreme court reversed the court of appeal 
judgment and dismissed the wrongful death action by the par-
ents of a suicide victim against a church and its pastoral 
175. Bellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 620, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538 (1978). In 
this mal-practice action, plaintiffs/parents brought an action for wrongful death against 
a psychiatrist who was treating their daughter. The plaintiffs alleged that the psychia-
trist had failed to prevent their daughter from committing suicide. The court held that 
the psychiatrist had a duty to prevent the suicide. [d. 
176. Meier, 69 Cal 2d at 427, 445 P.2d at 524-25, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09. 
177. 1d. at 435, 445 P.2d at 530, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 914. 
178. 1d. at 424-25, 445 P.2d at 523, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 907. 
179. 1d. at 426-27, 445 P.2d at 524, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09. 
180. See text infra p. 473. 
181. Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 297, 763 P.2d 948, 959, 253 
Cal. Rptr. 97, 108 (1988). 
182. 1d. 
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counselors. 
The supreme court found that the plaintiffs did not estab-
lish that the defendants had a duty to prevent the suicide.18s 
The court held that a nontherapist counselor who provides 
counseling to a potential suicidal person on secular or spiritual 
matters does not give rise to a duty to refer that person to pro-
fessional care.184 The duty to refer is limited to hospitals and 
physicians, psychiatrists, and psychologists who are profession-
als and who have control over the environment.18~ The court 
stated, 
[o]ne can argue that it is foreseeable that if a 
nontherapist counselor fails to refer a potentially 
suicidal individual to professional, licensed thera-
peutic care, the individual may commit suicide. 
While under some circumstances counselors may 
conclude that referring a client to a psychiatrist is 
prudent and necessary, our past decisions teach 
that it is inappropriate to impose a duty to refer-
which may stifle all gratuitous or religious coun-
seling-based on foreseeability. Mere foreseeability 
of harm or knowledge of danger is insufficient to 
create a legally cognizable special relationship giv-
ing rise to a legal duty to prevent harm.18e 
Therefore, this case would support the proposition that the fam-
ily members in a wrongful death suit of a person with HIV dis-
ease, will not be able to establish that a clergy person or other 
volunteer nonprofessional has a duty to refer a potentially sui-
cidal person to a medical professional. 
3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
In September of 1989, the California Court of Appeal In 
Holliday v. Jones 187 held that 
in order to recover for the negligently inflicted 
emotional distress damages, a plaintiff must ei-
ther have a special relationship to the defendant 
183. Id. at 304, 763 P.2d 948, 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 113. 
184. Id. at 292·96, 763 P.2d at 956·58, Cal. Rptr. at 105·08. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 297, 763 P.2d at 959, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108. 
187. Holliday v. Jones, 215 Cal. App. 3d 102, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, (1989) modified, 
214 Cal. App. 3d 465 (1989). 
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(Marlene F.), be the direct object of some aspect 
of the defendant's conduct (Molien) or personally 
witness a negligently caused physical injury to a 
closely related primary victim (Dillon; Ochoa; 
Thing). Beyond these categories, the only excep-
tion seems to be the recovery by spouses of loss of 
consortium damages. ISS 
481 
The court noted that the California Supreme Court has made a 
policy decision that costs associated with attempting to compen-
sate intangible losses are socially significant and can no longer 
be ignored. ls9 Therefore, any action brought for the negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress regarding the assistance of suicide 
must fit within the narrowly defined circumstances cited above 
in Holliday. 
The supreme court in Marlene F. et al., v. Affiliated Psychi-
atric Medical Clinic, Inc.,t90 held that damages were recoverable 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress because the injury 
to the plaintiffs was foreseeable. 191 In this case, two mothers 
sued the psychiatrist for the emotional harm each received be-
cause the psychiatrist molested their sons.192 Both mothers and 
their sons were patients of the psychiatrist.193 The court stated, 
"It bears repeating that the mothers here were the patients of 
the therapist along with their sons, and the therapist's tortious 
conduct was accordingly directed against both."194 This decision 
indicates that a spouse, parent, or child of a suicide victim 
would not fall within the special relationship required to state a 
claim for emotional distress unless that member could establish 
that the defendant's conduct was directed against him or her as 
well as the suicide victim. In other words, the therapist must 
know or should have known that his or her actions toward the 
suicidal victim would directly injur and cause severe emotional 
188. Id., at 111, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 453 (1989) modified, 214 Cal. App. 3d 465 (1989). 
189. Id. at 107, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 450. 
190. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 
P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989). 
191. Id. at 591, 770 P.2d at 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103. "It is no less foreseeable that 
a mother who consults a therapist for purposes of stabilizing and improving her relation-
ship with her son, and who commits herself and her son to the therapist's care, would 
. feel betrayed and suffer emotional distress upon learning that the therapist had, during 
the course of the treatment, sexually molested her son." [d. 
192. Id. at 585-86, 770 P.2d at 279, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 99. 
193. [d. 
194. [d. at 591, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal: Rptr. at 103. 
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distress to the family member. 
In addition, the court of appeal in Newton v. Kaiser Foun-
dation Hospitalsl 9 r. held that a duty of care may arise from con-
tract.IDO The court held that Kaiser had a duty to the mother 
because Kaiser entered into a contract with the mother to pro-
vide care and treatment for herself and child during the birth 
process. The child sustained permanent and irreparable paraly-
sis of the upper arm because of the unnecessary and excessive 
traction to the .child's head with forceps at delivery. 
Therefore, a contract between a medical professional and 
another person such as the parent of a person with HIV disease 
may give rise to the duty not to inflict emotional damage negli-
gently on the parent. For example, a physician whose negligent 
conduct causes the suicide of a minor suffering from AIDS could 
be liable to the parent (who entered into a contract for the care 
of the son) for emotional distress. 
The court, in Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp.,l97 found that 
a physician owed a duty of care to the patient's husband because 
the physician instructed Mrs. Molien to have her husband ex-
amined, confirming that the "tortious conduct was directed to 
him as well as to his wife."198 Here, the physician incorrectly di-
agnosed Mrs. Molien with syphilis.199 Because of the nature and 
transmission of the disease, the diagnosis led to marital mistrust 
which resulted in divorce.2oo The husband brought an action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, which was upheld.201 
However, in the case of a person with HIV disease who commits 
suicide, it is unlikely that a spouse, parent, or child of the sui-
cide victim could establish that the physician intended to direct 
the "tortious conduct" at the victim's survivors. 
195. Newton v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392, 228 Cal. 
Rptr. 890, 894 (1986). 
196. [d. at 392, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894. 
197. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 
(1983). 
198. [d. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. 
199. [d. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832. 
200. [d. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33. 
201. [d. at 919, 933, 616 P.2d at 814, 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832, 841. 
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In Dillon v. Legg,202 the Supreme Court of California held 
that a mother who saw her daughter killed by a car as she 
crossed an intersection was entitled to emotional damages.203 
The supreme court stated that the "chief element" in establish-
ing liability is the foreseeability of the injury to the mother.204 
The court considered such factors as plaintiff's distance from 
the scene of the accident, whether the plaintiff observed the ac-
cident sensorially and contemporaneously and whether the vic-
tim and the plaintiff were closely related.2011 Application of these 
factors to a situation where a person with HIV disease commits 
suicide would require that the closely, related person be present 
and observe the suicide both sensorially and contemporaneously. 
V. CONCLUSION: CALIFORNIA COURTS SHOULD DIS-
TINGUISH THE CASE OF A RATIONAL SUICIDE AND 
PROTECT THOSE PERSONS, THEIR LOVED ONES, AND 
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS FROM UNJUST LEGAL 
RAMIFICATIONS 
California case law206 has recognized the right of 
nonterminally ill persons to terminate life support systems in-
cluding feeding mechanisms. The court of appeal in Bartling 
dismissed the state's interests in protecting the sanctity of life, 
stating that the state's interest is in protecting persons from ir-
rational suicides. The court in Bouvia stated that the choice of a 
nonterminally ill person to withdraw a life-sustaining feeding 
tube is a moral and philosophical decision that was hers alone in 
light of her own assessment of her quality of life. 
These decisions demonstrate that the California courts rec-
ognize that the choice to end one's life when suffering from a 
painful and debilitating illness under the circumstances is ra-
tional. These decisions illustrate that the California courts have 
adopted the majority of the medical profession's scientific find-
ing that mental illness underlying suicide does not apply to the 
situation of persons suffering from painful and debilitating 
illness. 
202. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
203. [d., at 730, 747-748, 441 P.2d at 914, 924-925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74, 84-85. 
204. [d. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
205. [d. 
206. See text infra p. 447. 
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Justice Compton, who provided the concurring opinion in 
Bouuia, stated that "[t]he right to die is an integral part of our 
right to control our own destinies ... [which includes] the abil-
ity to enlist help from others . . . in making death as painless 
and as quick as possible."207 In essence, Justice Compton is ad-
vocating that persons who choose not to live any longer by refus-
ing medical treatment should not have to die of malnutrition 
and dehydration. Instead, a person should be able to enlist a 
physician who would end his or her life through a planned, 
quick, and painless injection. 
As this article has pointed out, California's laws, as well as 
their application, do not reflect the concept of rational suicide. 
However, the fact that California's laws regarding "mercy kill-
ings" are applied inconsistently indicates that society is uncom-
fortable in applying these laws in situations involving a rational 
suicide. For example, some physicians who actively assist a sui-
cide are prosecuted and found innocent.208 Others (nonphysi-
cians) who assist a suicide plead guilty to voluntary manslaugh-
ter and receive varying sentences.209 The varied application of 
the law in California in and of itself speaks to the need to con-
front the issue of assisting rational suicide. 
Because suicide under the circumstances of a debilitating 
illness is considered rational, those who aid the suicide or per-
form a "mercy killing" should be free of criminal prosecution of 
either murder, manslaughter, or aiding and abetting a suicide. 
The state interests cited in In re Joseph G.210 are not applicable 
to the situation of a terminally ill person. The person who assists 
a loved one who is dying of an HIV disease condition does so not 
for personal gain but out of compassion. The state's interest in 
the sanctity of life is severely diminished, if not absent, given 
the fact that the person requests to die because his or her life is 
without quality, purpose, or contribution and instead is filled 
207. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (Compton, J., 
concurring). 
208. Engelhardt and Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal 
Sanctions, 36 Sw. L. J. 1003 (1982) (citing N.Y. Times Mar. 7, 1950, at 1, col. 1. and 
Houston Chronicle, June 22, 1973, section 4, at 10, col. 1.) A physician in New York and 
another physician in New Hampshire were both acquitted where each physician had ad-
ministered a fatal injection. [d. 
209. See text infra p. 459. 
210. See text infra p. 444. 
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with anxiety and pain. Therefore, the courts should not apply 
the criminal or relevant civil statutes to a true "mercy killing" or 
an assisted suicide. These laws are applicable only to those sui-
cides which are irrational and motivated by personal gain. 
Labeling participation in rational suicide as a criminal ac-
tion results in the isolation of the terminally ill from their fam-
ily, their physicians, and other caregivers. This deprives them of 
a peaceful and dignified ending of their life. Often, the termi-
nally ill are forced to spend their last hours alone in order to 
protect the ones they love from criminal or civil actions. Until 
the laws are changed or interpreted differently rational suicides 
will continue to take place in secrecy under conditions which 
lack support and comfort. 
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